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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1 As a matter of law, was Olson's inadvertent failure to appear in court 
sufficient to warrant the serious sanction of criminal contempt? 
In a criminal bench trial, the appellate court will invalidate a guilty verdict if the 
verdict is based exclusively "on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt'" Spanish Fork City v Bryan, 975 P 2d 501, 502 (Utah Ct App 
1999) (citation omitted) Whether the trial court's findings support a legal conclusion 
that Sergeant Olson committed criminal contempt is a question of law that is leviewed for 
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's determination See State v Long, 
844 P 2d 381, 383 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
ISSUE 2 Was the evidence presented sufficient to support the trial court's 
findings that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Olson knew what was required of him and 
intended his acts to obstruct the judicial process? 
A trial court's findings of fact will be overturned if they are "'against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made '" Id (citation omitted) 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. §78-32-1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-32-15 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988) 
State v. Long, 844 P.2d 381 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 2, 2001, Sergeant Kevin Olson ("Sergeant Olson") and Deputy Doug 
Brown arrested Randall Lanza on a criminal assault charge. (R. 44-46) Although he was 
ill at the time, Olson appeared in the Fifth District Court on July 11, 2001 for Lanza's 
preliminary hearing. (R. 60:24) At the preliminary hearing, Deputy Iron County 
Attorney Paul Bittmenn ("Bittmenn") told Sergeant Olson that he would not have to 
appear at trial because Lanza would be accepting a plea agreement. (R. 60:54) When 
Sergeant Olson later received a subpoena to appear in court for Lanza's trial on July 30, 
2001 he believed the subpoena had been issued mistakenly. (R. 60:25) Because he 
thought he had no scheduled obligations on July 30th, Olson went camping with his 
family and did not appear at Lanza's trial. (R. 60:26) 
After the preliminary hearing, Iron County Attorney Scott Burns, presented an 
affidavit in support of a motion for Order to Show Cause. (R. 33-36) A hearing was held 
on the Order to Show Cause on August 28, 2001. (R. 40) The evidence presented at that 
hearing showed that Sergeant Olson did not appear for Lanza's trial because he 
mistakenly believed that the subpoena was issued erroneously, and thought that his 
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presence was not needed in court on July 30th. (R. 60:24-26) The State did not present 
any evidence to show that Sergeant Olson intended his acts to obstruct the judicial 
process. 
The evidence also showed that Sergeant Olson has worked in Utah law 
enforcement for 26 years, 23 of those with the Utah Highway Patrol. (R. 60:22) In all 
those years, Olson has never been disciplined or suspended, and he has never failed to 
appear in court when required. (R. 60:22-23) In those few instances where Olson has not 
been able to make a scheduled appearance in court—for instance, when he was in the 
hospital—he has cleared those absences in advance with the county attorney's office. (R. 
60:23) 
At the close of evidence, the trial court ruled from the bench, finding that Sergeant 
Olson knew what was required of him, was able to comply with the subpoena, and 
intentionally failed to appear in court. (R. 60:53-54) After making these findings, the 
court added: 
But let me say that I do find some mitigation . . . . And that is 
this: He was told - the court finds that he was told at the 
hearing that there wouldn't be a trial, that there would be a 
plea agreement. I find that based on his testimony and 
Officer Brown's testimony. 
But I'm persuaded from [Sergeant Olson's] apology, from the 
totality of the testimony, that it's not a situation where I 
should impose jail. Whether it's a police officer or any other 
citizen, to knowingly not come and intentionally in a 
contemptive manner—if I thought it was that, I would send 
him to jail. 
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(R. 60:54) (Emphasis added.) Based on these findings, the trial court found Sergeant 
Olson guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to ten days in jail, suspending 
execution of the jail sentence so long as Sergeant Olson paid a fine of $425.50 within 
four months. (R. 60:55) The Court later entered a written contempt order, which 
included findings of fact. (R. 51-55) Sergeant Olson paid the fine on September 25, 
2001, without prejudice to his rights on appeal. (R. 57) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Sergeant Olson made a mistake. He failed to appear in Court on July 30th for 
Lanza's trial because he genuinely believed that the subpoena had been issued 
erroneously. The trial court believed that Sergeant Olson's failure was the result of a 
mistake, and made an express finding of fact to that effect. 
Under Utah law, Sergeant Olson's mistake is not sufficient to constitute criminal 
contempt. In addition, the evidence presented below was not sufficient to support the 
trial court's findings that Sergeant Olson knew what was required of him and 
intentionally failed to comply. The evidence showed just the opposite: that Sergeant 
Olson mistakenly believed he did not need to appear in court, and thus did not know what 
was required of him; and that Sergeant Olson did not intend his acts to obstruct the 
judicial process. Criminal contempt is a serious sanction that, under Utah law, should not 
be imposed for behavior that is a result of genuine confusion. 
This case was clouded by three legally irrelevant facts. First, the trial court and 
the Iron County attorney were understandably upset about Sergeant Olson's failure to 
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appear. In particular, the county attorney's office was angered because years earlier, 
another officer had failed to appear pursuant to a subpoena. Both the court and the 
county attorney wanted to send a message, via Sergeant Olson's conviction, to the other 
law enforcement officers in Iron County. Second, the county attorney cut a deal with 
Lanza at trial, and a few days later Lanza committed another assault. Finally, the issue of 
whether Sergeant Olson's mistake was reasonable figured prominently in the trial court's 
decision to convict him of criminal contempt. 
None of these three factors is legally relevant to the issue before the trial court: 
namely, whether the State could prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Sergeant Olson 
knew what was required of him and intentionally failed to comply. Under Utah law, a 
mistaken course of action is not enough to sustain a conviction for criminal contempt. 
The trial court found that Sergeant Olson's failure to appear was a mistake. Sergeant 
Olson's conviction for criminal contempt should be vacated, and the fine be paid 
refunded. 
ARGUMENT 
"Utah law on the subject of contempt must be drawn together from case law and 
from statutes." Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1166-67 (Utah 1988). Two 
statutes and a relatively well-developed body of case law govern the analysis before this 
Court. Section 78-32-1 of the Utah Code provides that "[disobedience of a subpoena 
duly served" is "contempt[] of the authority of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1 
(1996). Section 78-32-15 provides that 
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Whenever . . . any person duly subpoenaed to appear and give 
evidence . . . shall neglect or refuse to appear . . . according to 
the requirement of such subpoena, . . . he shall be deemed in 
contempt, and it shall be the duty of the person [issuing the 
subpoena] to report the fact to the judge of the district court 
of the county, who may thereupon issue a warrant of 
attachment to bring such person before the judge by whose 
order such attachment was issued, or an order to show cause 
may be granted in the discretion of the judge. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-15 (1996). 
These two statutes do not constitute a strict-liability standard, and must be 
considered in light of pronouncements by this Court and our supreme court on what 
conduct warrants the serious sanction of contempt. In other words, it is not enough to say 
that Sergeant Olson is guilty of contempt merely because he did not appear in court on 
July 30th. Rather, controlling case law instructs that "c[t]o be held in contempt, a party 
must have (1) known of the duty imposed by the court's order, (2) had the ability to 
comply with the order, and (3) willfully and knowingly refused to comply.'" Envirotech 
Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 498 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Utah Farm Prod 
Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988)). "These three elements must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal contempt proceeding." State v. Hurst 
821 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Significantly, this Court has previously held 
that to constitute contempt, the conduct in question cannot have been the result of 
negligence, accident, or mistake. See State v. Long, 844 P.2d 381, 386 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
'"This Court's review of a contempt citation involves two questions: first, 
whether the underlying order is lawful; and second, whether the party's conduct in 
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violating the order constitutes contempt of court.'" Envirotech, 872 P.2d at 497 (citation 
omitted). Although it is undisputed that the subpoena was not properly issued, Sergeant 
Olson did not challenge that point below.1 Instead, Sergeant Olson contends that (1) as a 
matter of law, his conduct was not contemptuous; and (2) the evidence presented below is 
insufficient to support the trial court's findings of fact, even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's ruling. 
A. Sergeant Olson's failure to appear is not legally sufficient to warrant the 
severe sanction of criminal contempt because it was the result of mistake 
and inadvertence, and was not intended to obstruct the judicial process. 
Sergeant Olson was convicted of criminal, rather than civil, contempt. See State 
v. Long, 844 P.2d 381, 384 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "The very amplitude of the [criminal 
contempt] power is a warning to use it with discretion, and a command never to exert it 
where it is not necessary or proper.'" Long at 387 (quoting Gompers v. Buck Stove & 
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451, 31 S.Ct. 492, 502 (1911)). 
Because criminal contempt is such a serious sanction, this Court has held that to 
constitute contempt the conduct complained of must be deliberate, willful, and performed 
with the intent "to obstruct the judicial process." Id at 387. The Long case is instructive. 
In that case, the defendant attorney's legal assistant told a client that the client did not 
need to report to jail as ordered by the trial court, because the attorney had filed a Notice 
of Appeal and stayed execution of the client's sentence. Id. at 383. In fact, the attorney 
1
 The State stipulated that the subpoena was not properly served under Rule 14 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. (R. 60:17) Rule 14 provides that "[s]ervice shall be 
made by delivering a copy of the subpoena to the witness or interpreter personally and 
notifying the witness or interpreter or the contents." Utah R. Crim. P. 14(c). 
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had not followed the proper procedure for staying execution, and was confused about 
how exactly to do it. Id The trial court convicted the attorney of criminal contempt. Id. 
On appeal, the attorney argued that his "alleged violation was not willful," and 
that the statute required "the commission of a 'deliberate or intended violation, as 
distinguished from an accidental inadvertent or negligent violation '" Id. at 386. In 
support of a finding of contempt, the State "insisted] that while the statute requires more 
than a showing of simple negligence, it does, not require a showing of specific intent or 
bad faith." Id at 380. This Court agreed with the attorney 
This Court's resolution of the Long case turned on its anal) sis of the requirement 
that to be contemptuous, a party's behavior must be "willful and knowing."2 Envirotech, 
872 P.2d at 498. In analyzing the "willful neglect or violation" language of § 78-32-1, 
the court stated that "'[wjillfuL modifies both and describes the mental state necessaiy 
for criminal liability to attach " Long, 844 P.2d at 386. Although no case law 
specifically defined "willful" in the context of 78-32-L "Utah cases have discussed the 
degree of intent necessary to sustain a criminal conviction. It must appeal '(\) the party 
knew what was required of him; (2), that he had the ability to comply; and (3), that he 
wilfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so." Id, at 386 (quoting Thomas v. 
Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1979)). 
2
 At the trial, the attorney in Lons was found in contempt under subsection (3) of section 
78-32-1, which provides that "willful neglect or violation of duty by an attorney, counsel, 
clerk, sheriff, or other person . . . to perform a judicial or ministerial service constitutes 
contempt." Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1(3) (1996). However, the holding in Long was 
premised on the nature of criminal contempt generally, and was not dependent on 
whether the alleged contemnor was charged under one subsection or another. 
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This Court noted that "negligent or accidental mistakes were not sufficient under 
Utah common law to sustain a criminal contempt conviction." Id. As a result, "Utah 
courts 'will not be easily prevailed on to proceed in [criminal contempt cases], if it 
appears that the matter complained of was rather owing to neglect or accident than 
design.5" Long at 386 (quoting In re Thomas, 56 Utah 315, 326, 190 P. 952, 956 (1920)). 
Because the courts have historically required more than a negligent or accidental 
act for criminal contempt to attach, and because of the very serious mature of criminal 
contempt, this Court held "that 'willful neglect or violation' . . . requires a showing that 
defendant intended his acts to obstruct the judicial process." Id. at 387; see also In re 
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 659 (Utah 1988) (stating "under our general 
contempt law, no finding of contempt could issue unt i l . . . the court had conducted a 
hearing and made written findings that the witness had willfully refused to comply" 
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, this Court vacated the attorney's conviction for 
criminal contempt. In other words, because the attorney's instruction to his client was 
mistaken and accidental, as a matter of law it was not sufficient to constitute criminal 
contempt. 
Just like the attorney in Long, Sergeant Olson made a mistake. And in this case, 
the trial court specifically found that Sergeant Olson did not knowingly and intentionally 
fail to appear in court "in a contemptive manner." (R. 60:54) The trial court made no 
finding that Sergeant Olson intended to obstruct the judicial process. Rather, the trial 
court found that Sergeant Olson was "told at the hearing that there wouldn't be a trial, 
that there would be a plea agreement," (R. 60:54), and that this was the reason he did not 
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appear in court. (R. 60:54) "[T]o provide a defense to criminal contempt... the 
mistaken [course of action] must be one which was adopted in good faith and which, 
given the background . . . is plausible." Long at 386 (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). By finding that Sergeant Olson's actions were mistaken, the trial court 
implicitly found that Sergeant Olson's actions were plausible and in good faith. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, Sergeant Olson's actions were not sufficient to constitute 
criminal contempt. 
B. The evidence presented was not sufficient to support the trial court's 
findings that beyond a reasonable doubt Olson knew what was required of 
him and intentionally failed to comply with the subpoena. 
A party challenging the trial court's findings of fact must show that "the factual 
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all 
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination." State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994); see also Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 
P.2d 487, 498 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The appellant must present all the evidence that 
supports the challenged finding and then show that the evidence is nonetheless 
insufficient to support the finding. See State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^[41, 993 P.2d 837. 
Accordingly, Sergeant Olson will first marshal all the evidence in support of the trial 
court's verdict. 
40 
1. Evidence supporting the trial court's findings that Sergeant Olson 
knew what was required of him and intentionally failed to do so. 
The record shows the following evidence in support of the trial court's findings3 
that: 
(a) Sergeant Olson knew what was required of him: A subpoena was sent to 
Sergeant Olson's residence. (R. 60:7-8) Sergeant Olson received the subpoena. (R. 
60:19) Deputy County Attorney Bittmenn denied having told Sergeant Olson that he did 
not have to attend the jury trial. (R. 60:10, 15) 
(b) Sergeant Olson intentionally refused to comply with the subpoena: 
Sergeant Olson did not appear at the July 30, 2001 jury trial. (R. 60:10) Sergeant Olson 
was camping with his family on July 30th. (R. 60:11, 13, 19, 26) Although Sergeant 
Olson apologized to Deputy County Attorney Bittmenn, Bittmenn did not feel that 
Sergeant Olson's apology was genuine. (R. 60:19) Sergeant Olson did not call the 
county attorney to ask that trial be continued. (R. 60:10, 26) Bittmenn had the 
impression that Sergeant Olson was not very concerned about having missed trial. (R.. 
60:13) 
This evidence supports findings that Sergeant Olson received and read the 
subpoena, was camping on July 30th, and did not appear in court as directed by the 
subpoena. However, as discussed below, even when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the trial court's findings, this evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court's 
3
 Sergeant Olson does not challenge the trial court's finding that he had the ability to 
comply with the subpoena. 
4
 The trial court expressly found that Olson was told, at Lanza's preliminary hearing, that 
there would not be a trial. (R. 60:54). 
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findings that Sergeant Olson knew what was required of him and intentionally refused to 
comply with the subpoena. Instead, the evidence showed that even though Sergeant 
Olson received the subpoena, he mistakenly believed he did not need to appear in court. 
Whether Sergeant Olson should have known what was required of him is a separate 
question, one that is certainly important to the smooth operation of our justice system, but 
which was legally immaterial to the contempt analysis before the trial court. However, 
the evidence shows, and the trial court found, only that Sergeant Olson mistakenly 
believed he was not needed in court on July 30th. 
2. This evidence does not support findings that Sergeant Olson knew 
what was required of him or intentionally refused to comply. 
Again, the evidence presented supports only the conclusion that Sergeant Olson 
mistakenly believed his presence was not required. The trial court itself acknowledged 
this when it stated that it did not think that Sergeant Olson had "knowingly not come and 
intentionally in a contemptive manner." (R. 60:54) The evidence also shows that: 
Sergeant Olson was genuinely confused about the subpoena, and did not think his 
presence in court was required. (R. 60:24-26) In 26 years of law enforcement service, 
Sergeant Olson has never been disciplined or reprimanded, and has never failed to appear 
in court unless his absence was authorized in advance. (R.. 60:22-24) Sergeant Olson 
did not intend to miss court. (R. 60:33) He did not intend to violate the order contained 
in the subpoena. (R. 60:29) He did not go camping for the purpose of avoiding the 
subpoena. (R. 60:29) He did not intend to undermine the county's ability to prosecute its 
case. (R. 60:29) He apologized to the county attorney and to the trial court. (Findings of 
42 
Fact, R. 53) Olson was ill and asked to be dismissed from attending Lanza's preliminary 
hearing on July 11th. He was told he must attend. Even though he had a fever, Olson 
attended the preliminary hearing. (R. 60:14, 24) 
Even taking the facts marshaled above in the light most favorable to the court's 
ruling, the evidence is not sufficient to support the trial court's findings of fact. The 
evidence shows only that Sergeant Olson mistakenly believed he did not have to attend 
trial, and instead went camping with his family. And, as a matter of law, mistakes and 
"genuine confusion" are not sufficient to support a conviction for criminal contempt. See 
State v. Long, 844 P.2d 381, 387-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (vacating conviction for 
criminal contempt because alleged contemnor acted in genuine confusion). 
This case is really about the county attorney's displeasure at Sergeant Olson's 
failure to appear, which was compounded by an earlier and completely unrelated incident 
involving another officer. The issues below were further influenced by the fact that 
Lanza was a violent offender who committed another assault just days after being 
released pursuant to a plea agreement. Much was made by the State of Lanza's crime 
following his release, both at the hearing and in the State's memorandum in support of its 
motion for order to show cause. The trial court agreed with Sergeant Olson's objection 
that this matter was irrelevant to the contempt charges against Sergeant Olson, and 
sustained an objection on that ground. (R. 60:38) However, it is clear from the trial 
court's written order of contempt that Lanza's latter assault figured prominently in the 
court's decision to convict Sergeant Olson. Even though the trial court found that 
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Sergeant Olson's failure to appear was not knowing and intentional "in a contemptive 
manner," (R. 60:54), in the written Order of Contempt, the trial court stated: 
As the court noted in the courtroom, the situation in this case 
is uncommon. In 14 years on the bench the Court does not 
recall this situation occurring before. The Court holds no 
animosity towards Trooper Olson. However, for the system 
to work, all witnesses - police included - need to comply 
with subpoenas. In this case the subpoena was not obeyed 
and as a result, a person facing a felony assault charge was 
released and arrested on a new assault charge two days later, 
and unproductive taxpayer expenses were incurred. That is 
why a consequence must be imposed. 
(R. 60:53) Sergeant Olson's conviction was meant as an object lesson to the officers of 
Iron County, many of whom were present in the courtroom at the hearing. (R. 60:55) 
However, what happened after Lanza's trial is legally immaterial to the question of 
whether, by not appearing in court on July 30th, Sergeant Olson acted with willful intent 
to obstruct the judicial process. 
It is also irrelevant that Sergeant Olson could have - or even should have - called 
the county attorney's office to verify whether he needed to appear in court on July 30th. 
The burden of proof was on the State to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Sergeant 
Olson intended his acts to obstruct the judicial process. The State failed to do so. The 
court's concerns could have been addressed by a reprimand to Sergeant Olson, and the 
message would have immediately reached the assembled officers of Iron County. 
Sergeant Olson should only have been convicted if the evidence had shown, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that he knew he needed to be in court, yet failed to come with the 
willful intent to disrupt the judicial process. Instead, the court expressly found that 
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Sergeant Olson was genuinely mistaken about his obligation to attend trial, and that his 
failure to attend was not done "in a contemptive manner." Governing case law holds that 
criminal contempt sanctions should not be imposed "'if it appears that the matter 
complained of was rather owing to neglect or accident than design.'" Long at 386 
(citation omitted). Sergeant Olson was mistaken, but this mistake does not rise to the 
level of criminal contempt. His conviction should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
As a matter of law, Sergeant Olson's failure to appear in court does not warrant 
the extreme sanction of criminal contempt, because his failure to appear was owing to 
genuine confusion and mistake. And, the evidence presented does not support the trial 
court's findings in support of its Order of Contempt. Accordingly, Sergeant Olson's 
conviction should be vacated and the $425.50 fine refunded to him, with interest accrued 
from September 25, 2001. 
DATED this 5 ^ day of April, 2002. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
TaWrrHr-Skefman ^ J ^ 
Kamie F. Brown 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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true and correct copy of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT SERGEANT 
KEVIN OLSON to. 
J. Frederick Voros, Jr. 
Attorney General, Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South #600 
P.O. Box 140854 






History: C. 1953, 78-31b-8, enacted by L. 
1994, ch. 228, § 10. 
78-3lb-9. Dispute Resolution Fund — Appropriation. 
There is created within the General Fund a restricted account known as the 
Dispute Resolution Fund. There is appropriated from the Dispute Resolution 
Fund for fiscal year 1994-95, $100,000 to the Administrative Office of the 
Courts for the purpose of implementing the purposes of the Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Act. Fees established in Subsections 21-l-5(lXa) through 
(e), (l)(g), and (lXs) shall be allocated to and deposited in the fund. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31b-9, enacted by L. 
1994, ch. 228, 5 11; 1995, ch. 47, $ 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, updated the code 




78-32-1 Acts and omissions constituting 
contempt 
78-32-2 Re-entry after eviction from real 
property 
78-32-3 In immediate presence of court, 
summary action — Without 
immediate presence, proce-
dure 
78-32-4 Warrant of attachment or com-
mitment order to show cause 
78-32-5 Bail 
78-32-6 Duty of sheriff 
78-32-7 Bail bond - Form 
78-32-8 Officer's return 
78-32-9 Hearing 
78-32-10 Contempt — Action by court 
78-32-11 Damages to party aggrieved 
78-32-12 Imprisonment to compel perfor-
mance 
Section 
78-32-12 1 Community service for violation 
of visitation order or failure to 
pay child support 
78-32-12 2 Definitions - Sanctions 
78-32-12 3 Pilot program - Purpose -
Evaluation of pilot program 
— Exceptions 
78-32-13 Procedure when party charged 
fails to appear 
78-32-14 Excuse for nonappearance — 
Unnecessary restraint forbid-
den 
78-32-15 Contempt of process of nonjudi-
cial officer 
78-32-16 Procedure 
78-32-17. Noncompliance with child sup-
port order 
78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein 
are contempts of the authority of the court: 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge 
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or 
other judicial proceeding. 
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, 
tending to interrupt tire due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by 
an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to 
perform a judicial or ministerial service. 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a party 
to an action or special proceeding. 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court. 
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(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a court, and 
acting as such without authority. 
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue 
of an order or process of such court. 
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, 
remaining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on the 
calendar for trial. 
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of 
a court. 
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or 
to answer as a witness. 
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or serve 
as such, or improperly conversing with a party to an action to be tried at 
such court, or with any other person, concerning the merits of such action, 
or receiving a communication from a party or other person in respect to it, 
without immediately disclosing the same to the court. 
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of the 
lawful judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding in an 
action or special proceeding contrary to law, after such action or special 
proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior tribunal, 
magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the lawful orders or process of a 
judicial officer is also a contempt of the authority of such officer 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-32-1. 
Cross-References. — Abuse of office, § 76-
8-201 et seq 
Criminal Code not to affect contempt power, 
§§ 76-1-107, 76-3-201 
Defense costs in criminal actions, contempt 
based on failure of convicted defendant to pay, 
§§ 77-32a-7 to 77-32a-12 
Discovery, sanctions for noncompliance with 
order compelling discovery, Rule 37(bX2XD), 
U R C P 
Execution sale bidder, refusal to pay sum bid, 
Rule 69(i)(5), U R C P 
Judgment directing performance of specific 
act, Rule 70, U R C P 
ANALYSIS 
Ability to comply 
"Any other unlawful interference * 
Boisterous conduct 
Civil or criminal nature of proceedings 
Criticism or comments 
Deceit or abuse of process 
Disobedience by inferior tnbunal 
Disobedience of judgment, order, or process. 
Elements 
Excuses or defenses 
Findings of fact required 
Independent proceeding 
Inherent power of courts 
t Juvenile courts, §§ 78-3a-507, 78-3a-508 
Labor disputes, §§ 34-19-9, 34-19-10 
*" Masters, refusal of witness to appear or give 
evidence before, Rule 53(d)(2), U R C P 
r
' Penalties for failure to appear or complete 
jury service, § 78-46-20 
Power of judicial officers to punish for con-
Y
' tempt, § 78-7-18 
k Practice of law without a license, § 78-51-25 
) Repeated application for orders as contempt, 
' § 78-7-20 
1, Subpoena, refusal to obey, Rule 45(f), 
U R C P 
 Summary judgment affidavits made m bad 
faith, Rule 56(g), U R C P 
Neglect or violation of duty 
Perjury 
Purpose of section 
Territorial court3 
Cited 
Ability to comply. 
It is important that the ability of the party 
charged with contempt to perform receive con-
sideration before the court is justified in award-
ing damages Foreman v Foreman, 111 Utah 
72, 176 P2d 144 (1946) 
One who puts forth every reasonable effort to 
comply with court order, but is unable to do so, 
is not guilty of contempt on account of such 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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•93, to July 1,1994. The mandatory sanctions program is designed to provide 
petitioner with a speedy and effective remedy for substantial noncompliance 
visitation orders as provided in Section 78-32-12.2. 
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules to implement and administer this 
lot program. 
(3) As used in this section, a petitioner who files a petition under Section 
-32-12.2 in the first judicial district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1, where the 
lot program is administered, is governed by this section. 
(4) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall adopt a program to 
aluate the effectiveness of this pilot program. Progress reports shall be 
ovided to the Judiciary Interim Committee on the date of implementation of 
is section and on the results beginning October 1923 and April 1&J0- The 
iteria used to determine the results shall included survey of the: * ~ 
(a) petitioners and respondents in the first judicial district who partici-
pated in the pilot program and the remedies they recovered for substantial 
noncompliance with a visitation order or orders; 
(b) participants in the pilot program, including petitioners, respon-
dents, practitioners, court commissioners, and judges on the issues of 
noncompliance with visitation orders; 
(c) petitioners and respondents in the second judicial district who did 
not participate in the pilot program and the remedies they recovered for 
substantial noncompliance with a visitation order or orders; and 
(d) practitioners, court commissioners, and judges in the second judicial 
district on the issues of noncompliance with visitation orders. 
'5) The court shall suspend any proceedings under Section 78-32-12.2 if 
bstantial allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse are under investi-
tion or a case is pending in the courts on the allegations. 
listory: C. 1953,78-32-12.3, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
>3, ch. 152, § 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 152 
•-32-13. Procedure when party charged fails to appear. 
iVhen the warrant of arrest has been returned served, if the person arrested 
3S not appear on the return day, the court or judge may issue another 
rrant of arrest, or may order the undertaking to be prosecuted or both. If the 
dertaking is prosecuted, the measure of damages in the action is the extent 
the loss or injury sustained by the aggrieved party by reason of the 
sconduct for which the warrant was issued, and the costs of the proceeding. 
[istory: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, how made, Chapter 7 of Title 77. 
>p., 104-32-13. Demand for judgment, and costs, Rule 54, 
ross-References. — Arrest, by whom and U.R.C P. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
m. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt C J . S . - 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 81. 
98. Key Numbers. — Contempt <£=» 57. 
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78-32-14. Excuse for nonappearance — Unnecessary re-
straint forbidden. 
Whenever by the provisions of this chapter an officer is required to keep in 
custody a person arrested on a warrant of attachment an3 to bring him before 
a court or judge, the inability from illness or otherwise of the person to attend 
is a sufficient excuse for not bringing him up; and the officer must not confine 
a person arrested upon the warrant in a prison or otherwise restrain him of 
personal liberty, except so far as may be necessary to secure his personal 
attendance. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-32-14. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt C.J.S. - 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 81. 
§ 198. Key Numbers. - Contempt «£=> 57. 
78-32-15. Contempt of process of nonjudicial officer. 
Whenever authority is given to any person, officer (other than a judicial 
officer), referee, arbitrator, board or committee to issue process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses or the production of books or papers before such 
person, officer, referee, arbitrator, board or committee, and any person duly 
subpoenaed to appear and give evidence or to produce any books or papers 
shall neglect or refuse to appear or produce such books or papers according to 
the requirement of such subpoena, or shall refuse to testify or to answer any 
proper and pertinent question, he shall be deemed in contempt, and it shall be 
the duty of the person, officer, referee, arbitrator, board or committee as the 
case may be, to report the fact to the judge of the district court of the county, 
who may thereupon issue a warrant of attachment to bring such person before 
the judge by whose order such attachment was issued, or an order to show 
cause may be granted in the discretion of the judge. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Subpoena duces te-
Supp., 104-32-15. cum, Rule 34, U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Day Saints, 6 Utah 9, 21 P. 503 (1889). 
Dismissal of suit. Jurisdiction of district court. 
— Referee. 
Jurisdiction of district court. — State Tax Commission. 
— State Tax Commission. District court had jurisdiction of contempt 
— Tax division. proceedings brought by State Tax Commission 
against executor for refusal to obey subpoena. 
Dismissal of suit. Mayers v. Bronson, 100 Utah 279, 114 P.2d 213 
(1941). 
— Referee. 
A referee has no power to dismiss a suit — Tax division. 
because of a refusal of the plaintiff or a witness This section, which refers to the district 
to testify. He should report the matter to the court's power to judge a person in contempt for 
court and await its decision. United States v. failing to comply with an administrative sub-
Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter- poena, applies in the tax division of that court. 
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presumption of innocence is the " 'physical 
indicia of innocence ' " Mitchell, 824 P 2d 
at 473 (quoting Kennedy 487 F 2d at 104) 
However, a defendant's nght to the physi 
cal indicia of innocence must be weighed 
against "the essential state policy of pro 
viding security in the courtroom " Id 
Although we have never considered the 
precise issue of the use of metal detectors 
to ensure an orderly and safe trial1 we did 
consider the necessary balancing of the 
accused's right to the indicia of innocence 
against the need for security in the court 
room in State v Mitchell In Mitchell we 
held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by requiring the defendant to be 
shackled because of his violent criminal 
history and his pattern of escape attempts 
Id 
The United States Supreme Court has 
considered less intrusive security measures 
in balancing a defendant's right to the indi 
cia of innocence against the need for a 
secure and orderly trial In Holbrook v 
Flynn, 475 US 560, 106 S Ct 1340, 89 
LEd2d 525 (1986), the Court considered 
the use of uniformed security guards in the 
courtroom to supplement normal security 
measures The Court concluded the pres 
ence of the guards did not deny the defen 
dant a fair trial Id at 570, 106 S Ct at 
1347 The Court stressed that the use of 
uniformed guards, unlike dressing the de 
fendant in prison garb or placing him in 
shackles, was not an inherently prejudicial 
practice Id The Court pointed out that a 
wide range of inferences could be drawn 
from the presence of the guards other than 
the defendant was particularly dangerous, 
including a necessity to protect the pro 
ceedings from external disruptions Id at 
568-69, 106 S Ct at 1346 Thus, the use of 
1 In State v Cornwall 810 P 2d 484 486-88 
(Utah App 1991) a panel of this court approved 
the routine use of metal detectors in conducting 
administrative searches at courthouse entranc 
es 
2 See also United States v Carter 815 F 2d 1230 
1231-32 (8th Cir 1987) (use of a metal detector 
outside the courtroom upheld) State v Greena 
wait 128 Ariz 150 624 P 2d 828 845-46(1981) 
cert denied Greenawalt v Arizona 454 US 
882 102 SCt 364 70 L Ed 2d 191 (1981) (no 
abuse of discretion when spectators and jurors 
uniformed guards did not unduly detract 
from the defendant's presumption of mno 
cence 
Several other jurisdictions have ^onsid 
ered the use of metal detectors at the 
courtroom door and have found their use 
did not deprive the defendant a fair trial 
In State v Shipley, 429 N W 2d 567 (Iowa 
Ct App 1988), the Iowa Court of Appeals 
specifically addressed the use of metal de 
tectors at the courtroom door and found 
that the security practice did not violate the 
defendant's right to a fair trial when there 
had been anonymous death threats against 
the defendant The Shipley court found 
that the use of metal detectors in Shipley's 
trial were not inherently prejudicial Id at 
570 The court reasoned that unlike shack 
ling, metal detectors do not single out the 
accused or necessarily create the presump 
tion that the defendant is violent or danger 
ous Id The court also found the defen 
dant had not met his burden of proving 
actual prejudice from the use of this non 
inherently prejudicial security device Id2 
The Second District Court in Ogden 
found that a walk through metal detector 
was imperative in light of the high feelings 
in the community regarding the trial The 
court found that the metal detector was as 
much for the defendant's protection as it 
was for the protection of the general public 
and the court 
The trial court did not abuse its discre 
tion in allowing the use of the metal detec 
tor The selective use of a metal detector 
is not inherently prejudicial as the shack 
ling was in Mitchell Defendant has not 
demonstrated any actual prejudice from 
the use of this security device The facts 
indicate additional precautions were neces 
sary to maintain order and security for the 
were screened with metal detecting device) 
State v Myrick 228 Kan 406 616 P 2d 1066 
1076-77 (1980) (no prejudice when everyone 
entering courtroom was required to submit to 
metal detector inspection) State v Cooper 660 
SW2d 184 185-86 (Mo Ct App 1983) (defen 
dant not deprived of fair trial when metal detec 
tor used near rear door of courtroom) State v 
Davis 547 S W 2d 482 488-89 (Mo Ct App 1976) 
(uniformed police and metal detectors at main 
courtroom entrance not prejudicial) 
STATE v. 
Cite as 844 P.2d 381 
proceeding The jury could have drawn 
inferences not necessarily associated with 
defendant's innocence such as protecting 
the proceeding from outside influences as 
in Holbrook, or protecting the defendant as 
in Shipley In conclusion, we hold defen-
dant was not deprived a fair trial 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Next, defendant claims there was insuffi-
cient evidence to establish beyond a reason 
able doubt that he knowingly or intention-
ally attempted to cause the death of Rome 
ro when he fired the shotgun The State 
claims defendant has failed to marshal all 
the evidence in support of the jury's verdict 
and therefore we should not reach this 
issue Furthermore the State claims there 
is sufficient evidence to support a finding 
that defendant intended to shoot Romero 
To determine whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict, "we 
view the evidence and the reasonable infer 
ences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the verdict" State v Perdue, 
813 P 2d 1201, 1207 (Utah App 1991) We 
reverse only when the evidence so viewed, 
" 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted " Id (quoting 
State v Pedersen, 802 P 2d 1328, 1330 
(Utah App 1990), cert denied, 815 P 2d 241 
(Utah 1991)) 
[3] In challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the burden on the defendant is 
heavy Defendant " 'must marshal all evi-
dence supporting the jury s verdict and 
must then show how this marshaled evi-
dence is insufficient to support the verdict 
even when viewed in the light most favor 
able to the verdict State v Scheel, 823 
P 2d 470 (Utah App 1991) (quoting State v 
3 Even if we were to consider the issue on the 
merits the result would not differ Defendant 
claims he did not have the requisite intent for 
attempted criminal homicide However the 
record contains evidence upon which a reason 
able jury could conclude defendant intentional 
ly or knowingly attempted to kill Romero See 
Utah Code Ann § 76 5-203 (Supp 1992) Intent 
need not be proved by direct evidence but may 
LONG Utah 381 
(Utah App 1992) 
Perdue, 813 P 2d at 1207), accord State v 
Moore, 802 P2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App 
1990) 
[4] We agree with t^he State that defen 
dant has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the verdict In particular, de-
fendant failed to marshal the evidence 
which demonstrates he intended to shoot 
the victim Defendant's brief fails to refer 
to any of Hruska's testimony Hruska tes 
tified that he saw defendant aim the gun 
for five to seven seconds with the muzzle 
pointing slightly downwards before firing 
the third shot He then saw the victim fall 
from behind a shopping cart where defen-
dant had aimed and fired the gun Based 
on this testimony alone a reasonable juror 
could have concluded that defendant in 
tended to cause the death of Romero3 
Therefore we affirm defendant's convic 
tion 
JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ , concur 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Larry N LONG, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No 910708-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
Dec 16, 1992 
Attorney was convicted in the Third 
Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, Mi 
chael L Hutchings, J of indirect criminal 
be inferred from defendant s conduct State v 
Lopez, 789 P2d 39 43 (Utah App 1990) (quoting 
State v Davis 711 P2d 232 234 (Utah 1985)) 
Based on Hruska s testimony that defendant 
aimed the shotgun for five to seven seconds 
before firing at Romero a reasonable jury could 
conclude that defendant took a substantial step 
toward intentionally causing the death of Rome 
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contempt for advising client not to report 
to jail Attorney appealed The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, Associate P J, held that 
(1) affidavit adequately informed attorney 
of nature of contempt proceedings against 
him, and (2) evidence did not support find 
mg that attorney willfully neglected or vio 
lated duty 
Reversed and vacated 
1. Constitutional Law @=>273 
Contempt <s=»54(4) 
Affidavit of facts constituting con-
tempt satisfies statutory and due process 
requirements if it sets forth acts done or 
omitted that form factual basis for con 
tempt charge UCA1953, 78-32-3, 
USC A Const Amend 14 
2. Contempt <s=>54(4) 
Affidavit sufficiently notified attorney 
of acts done or omitted in violation of order 
of court which resulted in his conviction for 
indirect criminal contempt for willfully m 
structmg his client to disobey court order, 
and for filing improper motions, affidavit 
alleged that attorney's legal assistant in 
correctly advised client that case was being 
appealed and that client did not need to 
serve his sentence, and that attorney was 
directly responsible for his assistant's ac-
tions UCA1953, 78-32-3, USC A 
Const Amend 14 
3. Contempt <£*10 
Breach of lawyer's ethical duties, when 
violation affects integrity of court, satisfies 
statute which defines contempt as misbe-
havior in office, or other willful neglect or 
violation of duty by attorney U C A 1953, 
78-32-1(3) 
4 Contempt <S=»10 
Criminal contempt conviction requires 
more than attorney's violation of ethical 
duty U C A 1953, 78-32-1(3) 
5 Contempt <®=>10 
"Willful neglect or violation," for pur 
poses of statute defining contempt as mis-
behavior in office or other willful neglect 
or violation of duty by attorney, requires 
showing that attorney intended his acts to 
obstruct judicial process U C A 1953, 78-
32-1(3) 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions 
6. Contempt <s=>60(3) 
Evidence did not support attorney's in-
direct cnminal contempt conviction for in-
forming his client not to report to jail, as 
attorney did not willfully neglect or violate 
his duty as attorney, evidence showed that 
attorney was genuinely confused about 
proper motion required to stay sentence 
pending appeal, and made negligent mis-
take by informing his client not to report to 
jail U C A 1953, 78-32-1(3) 
Craig S Cook (argued), Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant 
Colin R Winchester, Gen Counsel (ar 
gued), Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and ap-
pellee 
Before BILLINGS, Associate P J , and 
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge 
Defendant, a licensed attorney, was 
charged with indirect criminal contempt in 
violation of Utah Code Ann § 78-32-1(3) 
and -1(5) (1990) The trial court found 
defendant guilty under each subsection 
Defendant appeals these convictions We 
reverse and vacate both convictions 
FACTS 
On November 30, 1990, Sheldon Saxton 
(Client) was arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol He hired an attorney, 
Larry Long (defendant), to defend him In 
July of 1991, Client was convicted, fined 
$910, and sentenced to serve five days in 
jail The court ordered Client to report to 
the jail on July 19 to begin serving his 
sentence 
At Client's sentencing hearing, defen 
dant requested an automatic stay of execu-
tion of sentence Defendant asked, "Do 
we not have a 30-day stay of the execution 
STATE v. 
Cite as 844 P.2d 381 
of the sentence, pending determination of 
whether [Client] wants to appeal or not?" 
The court responded, "Well, if he wants to 
appeal, I suppose he can, you know, make 
that decision, but I'm hesitant to put off 
these orders pending some possibility of an 
appeal Unless I have a document here, I 
don't know if it's going to be appealed or 
not" 
A few hours before Client was scheduled 
to report to jail, defendant filed a Notice of 
Appeal and a Motion for New Trial De-
fendant did not file a certificate of probable 
cause, which Utah Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 27 requires to stay the execution of a 
sentence Client, based on the advice of 
defendant's legal assistant, did not report 
to jail Nearly one week later, defendant 
filed a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and 
a Certificate of Probable Cause 
On August 15, Client and defendant ap 
peared before Judge Hutchings to explain 
Client's failure to report to jail Client 
excused his absence by referring to a tele-
phone conversation in which defendant's 
legal assistant told him he did not need to 
report to jail because defendant would be 
filing an appeal Also, during this hearing, 
the court examined defendant's under 
standing of the proper procedure to stay 
the execution of sentences Defendant ex 
pressed confusion about the requirements 
Near the conclusion of the August 15 
hearing, when it was apparent the court 
was considering charging defendant with 
criminal contempt, defendant reminded the 
court it could not charge him with indirect 
criminal contempt until he had been served 
with an affidavit describing the allegations 
against him The court agreed and re 
scheduled the hearing Soon thereafter, 
the City Attorney served defendant with an 
Affidavit and Order to Show Cause accus-
ing defendant of criminal contempt 
The affidavit charged that Client failed 
to report to jail and begin paying his fine 
because defendant's legal assistant, whose 
actions are attributable to defendant, incor 
1 Section 78-32-1(5) defines contempt as [d]is 
obedience of any lawful judgment order or 
process of the court Utah Code Ann § 78-32-
1(5) (1990) Because counsel for the State ad 
mits on appeal there are insufficient facts to 
LONG Utah 383 
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rectly advised Client his case was being 
appealed and that he, therefore, did not 
need to begin serving his sentence The 
affidavit further alleged that Client violat-
ed the court's order because defendant did 
not file a timely certificate of probable 
cause 
On November 1, defendant appeared be-
fore Judge Hutchings On November 7, 
Judge Hutchings concluded defendant had 
violated subsections (3) and (5)l of section 
78-32-1 and was guilty of indirect criminal 
contempt The trial court found defendant 
violated section 78-32-1(3) by breaching his 
duty to file the appropriate motions when 
he had the ability to file them, to keep his 
client accurately informed, to properly su-
pervise his legal assistant, to ensure proper 
information flowed from his law office to 
his client, and to remedy any incorrect in-
formation relayed from his office to his 
client The court sentenced defendant to 
pay $200 in fines and serve a thirty-day jail 
term suspended upon completion of forty 
hours of community service work 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On review of indirect criminal contempt 
proceedings "we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous" Von Hake v Thomas, 759 
P 2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988) We apply a 
"correction of error standard," however, 
when determining whether the court's find-
ings support a legal conclusion that defen-
dant violated a statutory duty See State 
v Taylor, 818 P 2d 561, 565 (Utah App 
1991), State v Serpente, 768 P 2d 994, 995 
(Utah App 1989) 
NOTICE 
Initially, defendant contends the affidavit 
filed against him did not adequately notify 
him of the nature of the contempt proceed 
ings against him The State maintains de 
fendant was properly notified because the 
support a conviction under section 78-32-1(5) 
we do not address this subsection in our opin 
ion but simply accept the State s concession and 
vacate defendants section 78-32-1(5) convic 
tion 
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affidavit sets out the facts giving rise to 
the contempt charges We agree with the 
State 
Due process requires a person charged 
with indirect criminal contempt " 'be ad 
vised of the nature of the action against 
him [or her], have assistance of counsel, if 
requested, have the right to confront wit 
nesses, and have the right to offer testimo-
ny on his [or her] behalf'" Von Hake, 
759 P2d at 1170 (quoting Burgers v Mai-
ben, 652 P2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982)) 
Utah Code section 78-32-3 specifically ad 
dresses this notice requirement "When 
the contempt is not committed in the imme 
diate view and presence of the court or 
judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be 
presented to the court or judge of the facts 
constituting the contempt" Utah Code 
Ann § 78-32-3 (1990) The purpose be-
hind this statutory right to an affidavit is 
"to ensure that the court and the person 
charged are informed of the conduct al 
leged to be contemptuous " Von Hake, 
759 P2d at 1170 
[1] An affidavit should apprise "the de 
fendant of the particular facts of which he 
is accused so that he may properly defend 
against the charge or offer such extenuat 
mg and justifiable circumstances as the 
facts may warrant" Robinson v City 
Court, 112 Utah 36, 41, 185 P2d 256, 258 
(1947) An affidavit satisfies section 78-
32-3 and due process if it sets forth the 
acts done or omitted that form the factual 
basis for the contempt charge See Cole 
man v Coleman, 664 P2d 1155, 1157 
(Utah 1983) (per curiam) 
[2] Defendant was convicted of willful 
ly instructing his client to disobey a court 
order and filing improper motions The 
telephone conversation between defen 
dant's legal assistant and Client gave rise 
to this charge The affidavit alleges "[de 
fendant's] legal assistant advised 
[Client] that the case was being appealed 
and he did not need to serve his sentence " 
The affidavit continues, "[defendant] had 
not complied with Rule 27, URCRP regard 
ing Stays Pending Appeal " And ' [defen-
2 The expression dipnitv of the court pro 
dant] filed [the appropriate motions] 
four days after [Client] was to begin serv-
ing his commitment and eight days after 
the first fine payment was due " The affi-
davit concludes 
[Defendant] is directly responsible for 
the actions of a legal assistant The 
advice given [Client] was in error since 
no appeal had been taken, no hearing had 
been held, no Certificate of Probable 
Cause had been issued and the Court had 
previously denied a[n] oral motion to stay 
the sentence 
This affidavit clearly notified defendant of 
"the acts done or omitted in violation of an 
order of the court" Coleman, 664 P 2d at 
1157 (citing De Yonge v De Yonge, 103 
Utah 410, 135 P 2d 905 (1943)) Thus, de-
fendant's claim of inadequate notice is 
without foundation 
SECTION 78-32-1(3) CRIMINAL 
CONTEMPT CONVICTION 
Next, defendant asserts the evidence 
does not support a finding he willfully ne 
glected or violated a duty of an attorney as 
required by Utah Code section 78-32-1(3) 
Section 78-32-1(3) defines contempt as 
"[misbehavior in office, or other willful 
neglect or violation of duty by an attor 
ney " Utah Code Ann § 78-32-1(3) (1990) 
First, defendant claims he did not violate a 
duty Second, he asserts any alleged viola-
tion was not willful 
Duty of an Attorney 
[3] Utah courts have not previously in-
terpreted "duty" in section 78-32-1(3) De-
fendant asserts ethical duties cannot sus-
tain a criminal contempt conviction The 
State argues the breach of a lawyer's ethi-
cal duties, when the violation affects the 
integrity of the court, satisfies section 78-
32-1(3) We agree with the State 
[4] Criminal contempt requires that the 
contempt order be issued to safeguard the 
integrity of the court "A contempt order 
is criminal if its purpose is to vindicate the 
court's authority, as by punishing an mdi 
vidual for disobeying an order " 2 Von 
claims a demand to all H^lmrr yy\\h \ho murt 
STATE v. 
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Hake, 759 P2d at 1168 Thus, a criminal 
contempt conviction requires more than an 
attorney's violation of an ethical duty See 
People v Wolf 162 111 App 3d 57, 113 111 
Dec 207, 209, 514 N E 2d 1218, 1220 (1987), 
appeal denied, 118 111 2d 551, 117 111 Dec 
231, 520 N E 2d 392 (1988) (holding viola-
tion of Code of Professional Conduct not in 
and of itself criminal contempt) See also 
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U S (19 Wall) 505, 
509-512, 22 L Ed 205 (1873) (distinguishing 
court's authority to hold someone in con-
tempt from power to sanction attorney for 
ethical violation), In re McCune, 717 P 2d 
701, 709 (Utah 1986) (distinguishing "focus 
and purpose" of ethical rules and criminal 
statute implicated by same behavior) Ac-
cordingly, a trial court should not use the 
serious sanction of criminal contempt to 
punish unethical conduct3 unless the con-
duct also impinges upon the integrity of 
the court 
The Ninth Circuit recognized this nexus 
m United States v Thoreen, 653 F 2d 1332 
(9th Cir 1981), cert denied, 455 U S 938, 
102 S Ct 1428, 71 L Ed 2d 648 (1982) In 
Thoreen, a district court charged a lawyer 
with criminal contempt because he, "with-
out the court's permission or knowledge 
substitute^] someone for his client at 
counsel table with the intent to cause a 
misidentification, resulting m the mislead-
ing of the court, counsel, and witnesses, a 
delay , and violation of a court order 
and custom " Id at 1336 In addition to 
finding an obstruction of justice, the trial 
court emphasized the lawyer's actions con-
flicted with three provisions of the Wash-
ington Code of Professional Responsibility 
Id at 1338 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit distin-
guished contempt convictions from ethical 
sanctions The court cautioned that defen 
for proper respect and obedience in its function 
of interpreting administering and enforcing the 
law within its authority to do so In re Dodson 
572 A 2d 328 332 (Conn ) cert denied — US 
I l l SCt 247 112 L Ed 2d 205 (1990) 
3 We recognize here as we have elsewhere that 
Utahs Rules of Professional Conduct provide 
guidance regarding a lawyer s legal obligations 
See State v Johnson 823 P 2d 484 (Utah App 
199U In Johnson a enmmal defendant appeal 
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(Utah App 1992) 
dant's ethical violations alone would not 
support a criminal contempt conviction un-
less they amounted to contumacious con-
duct Id at 1339-40 The court upheld 
the contempt conviction~because the ethical 
violation constituted an obstruction of jus-
tice, thus threatening the integrity of the 
court Id at 1341-42 See also People v 
Wolf, 162 111 App 3d 57, 113 111 Dec 207, 
514 N E 2d 1218 (1987), appeal denied, 118 
111 2d 551, 117 111 Dec 231, 520 N E 2d 392 
(1988) (vacating indirect criminal contempt 
conviction because lawyer's conduct was 
not "calculated to embarrass, hinder or ob-
struct the trial court in its administration 
of justice," and because "a violation of the 
Code [of Professional Conduct] does not 
[per se] constitute a criminal offense") 
Likewise, we hold neglect or violation of 
an ethical duty will support a criminal con-
tempt conviction under section 78-32-1(3), 
only if the ethical impropriety also imping-
es upon the integrity of the court 
In the instant case, the trial court relied 
primarily on the Utah Rules of Profession-
al Conduct to support the requirement that 
defendant "violate a duty of an attorney " 
The court found defendant did not keep his 
client reasonably informed as required by 
Rule 1 4 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, did not satisfactorily supervise 
his non-lawyer assistant, and did not en-
sure proper information flowed from his 
law office to his client, as required by Rule 
5 3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
The key question, therefore, is whether 
defendant's violation of these ethical duties 
impinged on the integrity of the court We 
conclude they did Defendant—even 
though he did not file the appropriate docu-
ments to stay the sentence—instructed his 
ed his conviction asserting he was denied effec 
tive assistance of counsel because a conflict of 
interest existed between him and his attorney 
See id at 487 In analyzing the lawyer s conflict 
of interest this court stated [wjhile violation 
of the Rules does not create any presumption 
that a legal duty has been breached courts 
have referred to the Rules to augment legal 
principles involving lawyer conduct Id at 489 
(quoting Utah R Prof Conduct Scope (1988)) 
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client not to report to jail4 Thus, he ad 
vised his client to disobey a lawful court 
order Client, relying on defendant's ad-
vice, disobeyed the court's order In sum, 
defendant violated a duty within the con 
text of section 78-32-1(8) when he instruct-
ed his client to ignore a lawful court order, 
because defendant's ethical violation in 
fringed on the court's integrity 
Willful Neglect or Violation 
[5] Defendant next claims the evidence 
does not support a finding he acted willful 
ly as required by section 78-32-1(3) De-
fendant urges the statute requires the com 
mission of a "deliberate or intended viola 
tion, as distinguished from an accidental, 
inadvertent, or negligent violation " The 
State insists that while the statute requires 
more than a showing of simple negligence, 
it does not require a showing of specific 
intent or bad faith 
Section 78-32-1(3) proscribes "willful ne-
glect or violation of duty by an attorney " 
The terms "neglect" and "violation" are 
opposite sides of the same coin "Neglect" 
refers to a failure to act and "violation" an 
inappropriate act "Willful" modifies both 
and describes the mental state necessary 
for criminal liability to attach 
Although no Utah appellate court has 
specially defined "willful" in section 78-
32-1(3), Utah cases have discussed the de 
gree of intent necessary to sustain a crimi-
nal contempt conviction It must appear 
"(1), the party knew what was required of 
him, (2), that he had the ability to comply, 
and (3), that he wilfully and knowingly 
failed and refused to do so " Thomas v 
Thomas, 569 P2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977), 
see also Mellor v Cook, 597 P 2d 882, 883-
84 (Utah 1979) "These three elements 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
in a criminal contempt proceedings " Von 
Hake, 759 P 2d at 1172 (citing Gompers v 
Buck's Stove & Range Co, 221 US 418, 
444, 31 S Ct 492, 499, 55 L Ed 797 (1911)) 
Additionally negligent or accidental mis 
4 Defendant does not challenge the trial court s 
decision to hold him responsible for the con 
duct of his legal assistant Thus for the pur 
pose of our discussion we assume the acts of 
L. I I t 
takes were not sufficient under Utah com 
mon law to sustain a criminal contempt 
conviction Utah courts 
"will not be easily prevailed on to pro 
ceed in [criminal contempt cases], if it 
appears that the matter complained of 
was rather owing to neglect or accident 
than design " 
[T]he mere fact that an attorney 
has advised his client contrary to the 
order or judgment, or to disregard it, 
does not necessarily constitute a con 
tempt of court 
In re Thomas, 56 Utah 315, 326, 190 P 
952, 956 (1920) (citation omitted) Utah 
criminal contempt cases have consistently 
required a showing of deliberate conduct 
See, eg, Utah Farm Prod Credit Ass'n v 
Labrum, 762 P 2d 1070, 1075 (Utah 1988) 
(stating that attorney's "acts, coupled with 
his knowledge of the duty imposed upon 
him, clearly evince his knowing and willful 
refusal to comply with the trial court's 
order"), In re Thomas, 56 Utah at 326, 190 
P at 956 (asserting criminal contempt re 
quires a finding contemnor acted by "de 
sign" and not by "neglect or accident") 
Similarly, other jurisdictions require de 
liberate contumacious conduct under their 
criminal contempt statutes For example, 
in Waste Conversion, Inc v Rollins Envi 
ronmental Services, Inc, 893 F2d 605 
(3rd Cir 1990), the trial court held an attor 
ney in contempt because he advised a wit-
ness not to go to a deposition Id at 606 
The attorney argued his mistake was unin-
tentional because in his home jurisdiction 
"filing a motion to dismiss generally was 
understood as staying discovery " Id at 
607 The Third Circuit responded, " '[t]o 
provide a defense to criminal contempt 
the mistaken [course of action] must be one 
which was adopted in good faith and which, 
given the background is plausible ' " 
Id at 609 (quoting In re Brown, 454 F 2d 
999, 1007 (DCCirl971)) The court ac 
knowledged " '[i]n the ordinary case of 
treat all acts as if done by defendant Because 
the issue was not argued we express no view on 
the propriety of imposing criminal contempt 
sanctions under a theory of respondeat superi 
STATE v. 
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advice to clients, if an attorney acts m good 
faith and in the honest belief that his ad-
vice is well founded and in the just inter-
ests of his client, he cannot be held liable 
for error in judgment'" Id at 610 (cita-
tion omitted) 
Likewise, the Florida Court of Appeals 
refused to sustain a contempt conviction 
when an attorney missed two hearings be-
cause he thought his secretary had filed a 
voluntary dismissal of the case Matter of 
Goldman, 546 So 2d 779, 780 (Fla Dist Ct 
App 1989) The court held the attorney's 
conduct "did not evince a willful disregard 
for the orderly administration of justice " 
Id at 781 
We agree the criminal contempt power 
should only be used to sanction deliberate 
contumacious acts or omissions As the 
United States Supreme Court has observed 
"The very amplitude of the [contempt] 
power is a warning to use it with discre 
tion, and a command never to exert it 
where it is not necessary or proper" 
Gompers v Buck's Stove & Range Co, 
221 US 418, 451, 31 S Ct 492, 502, 55 
L Ed 797 (1911) Based on the foregoing 
authority, we hold that "willful neglect or 
violation" under section 78-32-1(3) requires 
a showing that defendant intended his acts 
to obstruct the judicial process 
[6] Essentially, defendant is charged 
with advising his client to disobey a court 
order The facts, therefore, must support 
a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant knew the proper procedures to 
stay sentences, knew he had not complied 
with them, and nevertheless advised his 
client to disobey a lawful court order 
The trial court cursorily concluded defen 
dant "willfully neglected or violated a 
duty " The court, however, did not sup 
port its conclusion Nor do the facts sup-
port a finding defendant knew the proper 
procedure to stay sentences pending ap 
peal, and despite this knowledge advised 
his client to disobey a lawful court order 
The record demonstrates defendant was 
genuinely confused about the proper mo 
tion required to stay a sentence pending 
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MR LONG Rule 4 says all appeals in 
criminal cases shall be taken within thir 
ty days And then it says, if a motion 
for a new trial is made within thirty days 
after a notice of the-denial of the motion 
is given, and we filed a motion for a new 
trial on the 19th, the day he was sup 
posed to start serving the sentence, 
which is within the ten-day limit, and 
that's the same day we filed the Notice 
of Appeal The person who does my 
appeal briefs said we did not even have 
to file a Notice of Appeal until thirty 
days after the denial of our Motion for 
New Trial, but in order to stay execution 
of sentence, we decided we better file a 
Notice of Appeal Subsequently, the 
Court of Appeals has sent a notice that 
we had a docketing statement due within 
ten days 
THE COURT No No, no you're misun-
derstanding the rules Once a judge or-
ders that someone does something, that 
person does it, or should [do] it, unless 
the judge issues a certificate of probable 
cause, or any way grants a motion to 
modify in the case Just filing a notice 
of appeal or a request for a new trial 
does not in any way stop what a judge 
has ordered There's some certificate of 
probable cause language there, have you 
read that? 
MR LONG Well, the reason we filed 
the notice of appeal in spite of the advice 
we received is because I—I saw no other 
way under the rule to file a motion for a 
certificate of probable cause and a mo 
tion to stay the execution of the sentence 
pending appeal And I—somehow, I 
can't imagine the legislature foreseeing 
that someone could be—have a trial, be 
convicted and have a—be sentenced to 
serve something and pay a fine, and then 
have their rule just not say anything 
about how you stay the execution of the 
sentence pending appeal, so you know, 
I'm confused, as well as, I guess Mr 
Saxton and my legal assistant, about 
this 
The State did not rebut defendant's testi 
mony At most, the record demonstrates 
dpfpndant learned the DroDer procedure 
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about a week after he misinformed his 
client and filed the inappropriate docu-
ments, when he ultimately filed a motion 
for certificate of probable cause. If the 
State had produced evidence demonstrating 
defendant had followed proper sentence-
staying procedures in previous cases, such 
circumstantial evidence would have sup-
ported an inference defendant knew how to 
stay sentences at the time he filed the 
wrong motions and thus knew he was ad-
vising his client to disobey a lawful court 
order. The evidence in the record, howev-
er, merely demonstrates defendant made a 
negligent mistake by informing his client 
not to report to jail. 
We conclude there is insufficient evi-
dence to support a finding defendant will-
fully neglected or violated his duty as an 
attorney. The trial court's finding to the 
contrary is, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
Consequently, we vacate defendant's con-
viction of criminal contempt under section 
78-32-1(3). 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude the affidavit filed against 
defendant sufficiently notified him of the 
criminal contempt charges because it set 
out the acts done or omitted by defendant 
that formed the factual basis for the 
charge. In addition, we conclude that de-
fendant's unethical conduct supports a 
criminal contempt conviction for "violation 
of duty by an attorney" under section 78-
32-1(3) because the ethical violation also 
infringed on the court's integrity. Also, 
we find insufficient evidence to support a 
finding defendant acted willfully within the 
meaning of section 78-32-1(3). According-
ly, defendant's indirect criminal contempt 
conviction under section 78-32-1(3) is va-
cated. Finally, we also vacate defendant's 
conviction under section 78-32-1(5) because 
at oral argument the State conceded the 
facts will not support a contempt conviction 
under that subsection. 
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur. 
J*\ 
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XIENG v. PEOPLES NAT. 
Cite as 844 P2d 
120 Wash.2d 512 
J o h a n n a K. XIENG and Bathou Xieng, 
husband and wife, Respondents, 
v. 
PEOPLES NATIONAL BANK OF 
WASHINGTON, Petitioner. 
No. 59064-8. 
Supreme Court of Washington, 
En Banc. 
Jan. 21, 1993. 
Employee filed a employment discrimi-
nation claim against bank, alleging that 
bank's failure to promote him was national 
origin discrimination. The Superior Court, 
King County, Mary Wicks Brucker, J., en-
tered judgment in favor of employee. The 
Court of Appeals, 63 Wash.App. 572, 821 
P.2d 520, affirmed. On further review, the 
Supreme Court, Brachtenbach, J., held 
that: (1) employer's alleged good-faith be-
lief that national origin accent would mate-
rially interfere with job performance was 
not defense to statutorily prohibited em-
ployment discrimination; (2) payments 
made under disability insurance policy pur-
chased by employer as a fringe benefit for 
employees could not be offset against a 
judgment obtained by employee in discrimi-
nation action; (3) expert witness fees were 
proper element of cost award; and (4) em-
ployer was not entitled to adjustment of 
back pay award when employer allegedly 
eliminated disputed position for which em-
ployee applied. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <S=>362(1) 
Supreme Court would review only 
questions raised in appellant's petition for 
review, and not assignments of error raised 
only before Court of Appeals. RAP 13.-
7(b). 
2. Civil Rights <^142 
Employer does not have complete de-
fense to statutorily prohibited national ori-
gin employment discrimination based on 
good-faith belief that national origin accent 
wrmlH materially interfere with iob oerfor-
. BANK OF WASHINGTON Wash. 389 
389 (Wash. 1993) 
mance even though accent did not in fact 
do so; it would be incongruous for fact 
finder to be persuaded that national origin 
characteristic would not materially inter-
fere with job performance and, from same 
evidence, find that employer, in fact, in 
good faith and based on substantial evi-
dence held belief diametrically opposed 
thereto. West's RCWA 49.60.180. 
3. Appeal and Error ®=*839(1) 
Once employment discrimination case 
has been decided on merits, any issues con-
cerning employer's burden merge into ulti-
mate disposition of issue of discrimination 
made by trier of fact. West's RCWA 49.-
60.180. 
4. Appeal and Error ^1010.1(6) 
With respect of findings of fact by 
trial court in employment discrimination 
case, Supreme Court's role on review is 
simply to determine whether trial court's 
ultimate findings on issue of discrimination 
meet usual standard of review for factual 
findings—whether finding is supported by 
substantial evidence. West's RCWA 49.-
60.180, 49.60.180(3). 
5. Civil Rights <S=>454 
Proper test for application of collateral 
source rule to payments made under dis-
ability insurance policy paid for by employ-
er in employment discrimination case de-
pends upon nature of disability benefits; if 
disability benefits are fringe benefit of em-
ployment, collateral source rule applies to 
prevent offset. West's RCWA 49.60.180. 
6. Appeal and Error <3=>931(3) 
Where trial court did not make finding 
as to nature of disability policy in employ-
ment discrimination case, Supreme Court 
would treat case as though finding of fact 
had been made against party with burden 
of proof. 
7. Civil Rights <3=>454 
Employer had burden of proof of 
showing that it was entitled to offset dis-
ability insurance payment received by em-
ployee from judgment in statutory employ-
ment discrimination case. 
Finally, the conclusion reached by the 
majority produces an irrational and un-
workable standard disadvantaging child 
rape victims who at the time they are vio-
lated (and possibly at the time of trial as 
well) are sexually uneducated, unaware, or 
lacking understanding regarding the term 
"slight" in reference to their genitalia and 
penetration. Indeed, in view of today's 
decision, only those children who are sexu-
ally aware or concentrating during such 
victimization will be able, in some instanc-
es, to provide sufficiently detailed testimo-
ny regarding the extent of the defendant's 
activity to support the majority's determi-
nation of slight penetration. Many child 
victims will need to become sensitive and 
sexually educated before trial as to their 
anatomy, the meaning of slight pen-
etration, and the difference between the 
terms "on" and slightly "within," "be-
tween," or "into"—all in order to adequate-
ly describe such activity and terror. Also, 
the result today will seriously affect those 
child rape victims whose labial areas, be-
cause of anatomical immaturity, injury, de-
fect, or otherwise, are incapable of being 
entered sufficiently to meet the majority's 
implicit standard regarding the element of 
slight penetration. And lastly, juries will 
no longer be able to look past the victim's 
use (or nonuse) of a particular preposition 
or choice of words and conclude that given 
the evidence offered by the victim, the rea-
sonable inferences arising therefrom, and 
the possible immaturity or limited under-
standing of the child, the crime occurred. 
Clearly, society does not favor such re-
sults, and the law should not encourage 
such effect. Accordingly, I dissent. 
DURHAM, Justice: (concurring in 
the result of the Chief Justice's 
concurring and dissenting opinion) 
I join in parts I through V and in the 
factual analysis of part VI of the Chief 
Justice's concurring and dissenting opinion, 
although I do not share his concern that 
the majority has established an "irrational 
and unworkable standard disadvantaging 
child rape victims." I think the legal stan-
dard employed by both the majority and 
the dissent is the same. This is merely a 
close case on the evidence, in which consid-
erable deference is due to the inferences 
and conclusions made by the jury. 
(0 1 KEY NUMBER SYSTEM) 
Richard A. VON HAKE, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Harry Edward THOMAS and 1st National 
Credit Corp., a Nevada corporation, De-
fendants and Appellants. 
No. 19951. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 5, 1988. 
Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1988. 
Judgment debtor was adjudged in con-
tempt for failing to comply with court or-
ders requiring him to appear at show-cause 
hearing and to produce certain documents 
by the Sixth District Court, Kane County, 
Don V. Tibbs, J., and he appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: 
(1) contempt order intended to punish con-
temnor for failing to appear at show-cause 
hearing was "criminal" in nature and there-
fore appealable; (2) contempt order intend-
ed to coerce contemnor into producing cer-
tain documents was "civil" in nature and 
not appealable; (3) contemnor's failure to 
appear at show-cause hearing constituted 
"direct contempt," with which court could 
deal summarily; and (4) finding that con-
temnor had failed to appear at show-cause 
hearing notwithstanding his present ability 
to do so was not clearly erroneous. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
1. Contempt <$=>3, 4 
Primary determinant of whether par-
ticular contempt order is to be labeled civil 
VON HAKE 
Cite a* 739 ?2d 
or criminal is trial court's purpose in enter-
ing order. 
2. Contempt <s=»3 
Contempt order is "criminal" if its pur-
pose is to vindicate court's authority, even 
though order arises from civil proceedings. 
3. Contempt <£=>4 
Contempt order is "civil" if it has re-
medial purpose, either to coerce individual 
into complying with order given for benefit 
of other party, or to compensate aggrieved 
party for injuries resulting from individu-
al's failure to comply with order. 
4. Contempt <s=»3, 4 
Caption placed on contempt proceeding 
is one factor, in determining whether con-
tempt order is to be labeled civil or crimi-
nal. 
5. Contempt e=>3, 4 
Contempt order is "criminal" if fine or 
sentence imposed is fixed and uncondition-
al, but is "civil" if fine or imprisonment is 
conditional such that contemnor can obtain 
relief from contempt order merely by doing 
some act as ordered by court. 
6. Contempt <a=>4 
Contempt order is "civil" if order is to 
pay fine to other party, rather than to 
court. 
7. Contempt $=>3, 66(2) 
Contempt order intended to punish 
contemnor for failing to appear at hearing, 
which imposed flat 30-day sentence not 
conditioned on contemnor's failure to purge 
himself of contempt, was "criminal" in na-
ture and therefore appealable. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-32-4. 
8. Contempt <S=>4, 66(2) 
Contempt order intended to coerce con-
temnor into producing certain documents 
was "civil" in nature and not appealable. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-32-12. 
9. Contempt <fc*20, 51 
Party's failure to appear in violation of 
court order can, in appropriate circum-
stances, be treated as "direct contempt," 
with which court can deal summarily. U.C. 
A.1953, 7&-32-3. 
?. THOMAS Utah H 6 3 
1162 (Utah 1988) 
10. Contempt <*»20, 51 
Party's failure to appear, other than 
by counsel, at show-cause hearing was "di-
rect contempt," with which court could deal 
summarily. U.C.A.1953, 78-32-3. 
11. Contempt S»20, 51 
Party's failure to produce tax doc-
uments, as ordered, at hearing brought by 
judgment creditor was mere "indirect con-
tempt," which could not be dealt with sum-
marily. U.C.A.1953, 78-32-3. 
12. Constitutional Law <s=>273 
Contempt «=>40 
Court fully complied with party's due 
process rights in adjudging him guilty of 
civil contempt, where party had ample no-
tice of charges against him and of penden-
cy of show-cause hearing, at which he was 
afforded right to present evidence and con-
front witnesses, as well as right to assist-
ance of counsel. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
14; U.C.A.1953, 78-32-3. 
13. Contempt «=>20 
As general rule, in order to prove con-
tempt for failure to comply with court or-
der, it must be shown that person cited for 
contempt knew what was required, had 
ability to comply, and intentionally failed or 
refused to do so. 
14. Contempt «=>60(3) 
Elements of contempt must be proven 
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal con-
tempt proceeding, and by clear and convinc-
ing evidence in civil contempt proceeding. 
15. Contempt $=>63(3, 4) 
Adjudication of contempt must be 
based on written findings of fact and con-
clusions of law with respect to each sub-
stantive element. U.C.A.1953, 78-32-3. 
16. Contempt <S=>66(7) 
On review of both criminal and civil 
contempt proceedings, Supreme Court ac-
cepts trial court's findings of fact unless 
they are clearly erroneous. U.C.A.1953, 
77-35-26(7); Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a). 
17. Contempt «=>60(3) 
Finding that contemnor had failed to 
appear at show-cause hearing notwith-
n u t • viv * » V I J L i v i v u i U U A l i l V , kU kJXJAVXl^ C 
standing his present ability to do so was 
not clearly erroneous, for purpose of crimi-
nal contempt adjudication, though con-
temnor presented affidavit that he was re-
ceiving psychiatric care and that condition 
would have been exacerbated if he had 
appeared at hearing. 
18. Contempt «»66(8) 
Indirect civil contempt order would be 
reversed for lack of requisite written find-
ings and conclusions, where order did not 
provide any written findings and conclu-
sions regarding contemnor's ability to com-
ply with order. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a). 
Robert R. Brown, Ronald C. Barker, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants and appellants. 
H. Ralph Klemm, T. Quentin Cannon, 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Carolyn L. Driscoll, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Appellant Harry Edward Thomas chal-
lenges an order of commitment for con-
tempt entered during supplemental pro-
ceedings in the Sixth Judicial District 
Court Judge Don V. Tibbs found Thomas 
in contempt for failing to comply with 
court orders requiring Thomas to appear at 
a show-cause hearing and to produce cer-
tain documents. We affirm the finding of 
contempt, but only on the basis of Thom-
as's failure to appear. 
A detailed review of the conduct leading 
to the contempt order is warranted. In 
March of 1982, appellee Richard A. Von 
Hake obtained a judgment for fraud 
against Thomas in the amount of $987,200, 
plus costs and interest.1 Eighteen months 
later, when Thomas had failed to make any 
payments on the judgment, Von Hake com-
menced supplemental proceedings to dis-
cover the location and extent of Thomas's 
assets. Judge Tibbs ordered Thomas to 
appear at a hearing on November 4, 1983, 
to answer questions concerning his proper-
ty and income. The court's order provided 
that when Thomas appeared, he was to 
1. This judgment was affirmed in Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 705 ?2d 766 (Utah 1985). Thomas 
had not filed a supersedeas bond, and the sup-
produce all documents within his posses-
sion or control that might disclose informa-
tion about his property and income, includ-
ing tax returns. 
When Thomas did not appear at the No-
vember 4th hearing, the court issued a 
bench warrant for his arrest. The warrant 
was later recalled when Thomas agreed to 
appear at a rescheduled hearing and to 
post a $1,000 appearance bond. The re-
scheduled supplemental proceeding was to 
be held on January 6, 1984, and Thomas 
was ordered to produce the documents at 
that time. 
Thomas appeared on January 6th but 
produced no documents. Under question-
ing, he stated that none of the requested 
documents were within his possession or 
control. He repeatedly claimed that he had 
no recollection of the documents and that 
he had no knowledge of any property, in-
come, or other assets under his control. 
Thomas did admit that he had filed certain 
tax returns during the preceding five years 
but claimed that neither he nor his account-
ant had copies. Thomas also admitted that 
he had made no attempt to obtain copies of 
those returns from the Internal Revenue 
Service ("IRS"). 
The court ordered Thomas to produce all 
state and federal tax returns that he had 
signed during the preceding five years, 
without regard to whether the returns had 
been filed on behalf of Thomas or on behalf 
of any of the numerous corporations or 
partnerships with which he was or had 
been affiliated. Thomas was ordered to 
produce the documents within six weeks 
and was expressly warned that a failure to 
produce would be considered a contempt of 
court Judge Tibbs signed an order to that 
effect on February 1, 1984, specifically di-
recting that if Thomas had not produced 
the tax returns by March 2, 1984, then he 
was to appear personally before the court 
to show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt. 
On February 22nd, Thomas filed a mo-
tion for a sixty-day extension of time to 
plemental enforcement proceedings were not 
delayed by the appeal from the judgment of 
liability. 
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produce the tax returns. In support of his 
motion, he filed a notice sent to him by the 
IRS in response to his January 18th re-
quest for copies of his federal returns. 
The notice stated that the IRS would need 
up to sixty days to satisfy his request. 
On March 2nd, the trial court held the 
scheduled show-cause hearing and granted 
Thomas's motion for a sixty-day extension. 
Thomas was represented by counsel but did 
not appear personally on March 2nd, as he 
had been ordered to do. However, neither 
Von Hake nor the court made an issue of 
Thomas's absence, apparently because the 
request for an extension of time to produce 
the returns was granted. The judge did 
state on the record that Thomas was to 
appear in person at a hearing on May 4th 
at which the court would determine wheth-
er he had fully complied with the amended 
order to produce the tax returns. The 
judge warned Thomas's attorney that 
Thomas would "find himself in jail" if he 
did not cooperate. 
On March 12th, the court issued a writ-
ten order confirming the grant of the sixty-
day extension and directing Thomas to ap-
pear on May 4th "for a hearing on whether 
he has fully complied with the court's order 
and for sanctions associated therewith." 
After the March hearing, Thomas pro-
duced his personal federal income tax re-
turns for the years 1978, 1979, and 1982. 
On April 23rd, he moved for a second sixty-
day extension of time to produce the addi-
tional tax returns ordered by the district 
court The motion was supported by a 
letter from the IRS stating that copies of 
the personal returns for 1980 and 1981 had 
not yet been located and by Thomas's affi-
davit in which he swore that he had been 
unsuccessful in obtaining copies of corpo-
rate and partnership returns covered by 
the court's order. Thomas asked that the 
motion for more time be considered at the 
already scheduled May 4th hearing. In 
response, Von Hake's counsel submitted an 
affidavit opposing the request for a second 
extension of time and asking that the show-
cause hearing be held as scheduled on May 
4th. This affidavit included specific, factu-
ally supported allegations that Thomas had 
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access to the corporate and partnership 
returns covered by the discovery order and 
had willfully refused to produce them. 
Thomas later moved to strike the affidavit. 
On May 4,1984, the day of the scheduled 
show-cause hearing, Thomas filed a motion 
to continue the time for his appearance 
indefinitely. He supported the motion with 
a physician's affidavit stating that Thomas 
was under treatment as a psychiatric out-
patient and that his appearance in court 
would exacerbate his medical condition. 
The May 4th hearing proceeded as sched-
uled. Thomas did not appear but was rep-
resented by counsel. Because the con-
tempt order at issue resulted from that 
hearing, a detailed review of the hearing 
record is required. The two main issues 
addressed by Von Hake's counsel were 
Thomas's failure to produce corporate and 
partnership tax returns and his failure to 
appear in court 
The record shows that at the time of the 
hearing, Thomas had not produced any of 
the requested corporate and partnership 
tax returns. While he purported to have 
made efforts to obtain copies from the enti-
ties on behalf of which the returns had 
been filed, he had made no attempt to 
obtain copies from the IRS. Thomas's 
counsel argued that his client had done all 
that could be required of him; because 
Thomas was no longer an officer or owner 
of the entities, he was not entitled to copies 
of the returns from the IRS and could not 
compel the entities to provide copies. 
Thomas's counsel also represented that, in 
any event, it would now be impossible to 
obtain the returns because one or more of 
the corporations whose returns Von Hake 
was seeking had gone into another court 
and obtained protective orders directing 
Thomas not to deliver the returns. Appar-
ently neither Von Hake nor Judge Tibbs 
had been previously informed of this devel-
opment. 
In response to these arguments justify-
ing Thomas's failure to produce the corpo-
rate and partnership tax returns, Von 
Hake's counsel asserted that Thomas did 
have access to the returns because the 
various entities in question were little more 
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than legal facades under the de facto con-
trol of Thomas which he was using to con-
ceal his assets. This line of argument was 
supported in part by reference to deposi-
tions and testimony previously given in a 
related bankruptcy court proceeding. 
Moving to the other ground for con-
tempt, violation of the order to appear per-
sonally, the record shows that the judge 
first established that Thomas was not phys-
ically present in the courtroom. His law-
yer stated that Thomas had come to Kanab, 
where the hearing was being held, but 
asked that before the court considered 
Thomas's failure to appear, it first dispose 
of the motion for a further continuance 
based on the physician's affidavit. Von 
Hake's counsel responded that this motion 
was merely another in a series of dilatory 
tactics and should be rejected as spurious, 
based on the fact that one week earlier 
Thomas had attended a different court 
hearing lasting seven hours and had testi-
fied for two hours. Thomas's counsel then 
attacked the legality of the order to appear 
and show cause. He argued that this order 
denied Thomas due process by prospective-
ly requiring him to appear and show cause 
why he should not be held in contempt for 
failing to produce documents when it had 
not yet been established that Thomas had 
violated the underlying order to produce. 
As these arguments progressed, the 
court twice instructed Thomas's counsel to 
get Thomas and bring him before the 
court Thomas's counsel replied: "Your 
Honor, I cannot personally direct Mr. 
Thomas to appear especially in contra-
diction to the physician's affidavit. I can 
make inquiry as to whether or not he 
would be willing to appear in spite of that, 
your Honor." 
During the hearing, the court commented 
on several aspects of Thomas's conduct 
throughout the supplemental proceedings. 
The court stated that it appeared that 
Thomas was transferring assets among 
various business entities so that Von Hake 
would be unable to identify assets without 
the entities' tax returns; that obtaining an 
order from another court protecting the tax 
returns was "a direct attempt to contra-
vene an order of this Court"; and that in 
regard to the overall supplemental proceed-
ings and Thomas's tactics, "I'm a little fed 
up with this, . . . this court is being taken 
advantage of, . . . the time has run 
out " 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
court denied Thomas's motion to extend the 
time for production of the tax returns, de-
nied the motion to extend the time for 
Thomas's appearance, and denied the mo-
tion to strike the affidavit made by Von 
Hake's counsel concerning Thomas's ability 
to produce the documents. The court then 
found that Thomas had not complied with 
the order for production and had used im-
proper and dilatory tactics to frustrate the 
court's orders and avoid appearing in court. 
Accordingly, the court found Thomas in 
contempt of court, sentenced him to thirty 
days in jail, and ordered the preparation of 
an arrest warrant. 
On May 14, 1984, the court entered a 
formal order of commitment stating that 
Thomas was guilty of contempt for failing 
to produce the tax returns and for failing 
to appear at the May 4th hearing. We 
stayed execution of the order pending this 
appeal. 
On appeal, Thomas seeks reversal of the 
order requiring production of the tax re-
turns, the order denying him further time 
to produce, the order denying his motion to 
strike the affidavit of Von Hake's counsel, 
the order requiring his appearance on May 
4th, the order denying his request for an 
extension of time to appear, and the order 
of contempt. We first address the con-
tempt order. 
Thomas argues that entry of the con-
tempt order (i) was an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion because the underlying 
orders with which Thomas had failed to 
comply were unlawful, (ii) violated constitu-
tional and statutory due process require-
ments because Thomas was not given ade-
quate notice of the charges against him, 
and (iii) violated judicially imposed require-
ments regarding the substantive elements 
of a contempt finding. 
Utah law on the subject of contempt 
must be drawn together from case law and 
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from statutes. The earliest law in this 
area is decisional and based on the common 
law. See, e.g., In re Whitmore, 9 Utah 
441, 35 P. 524 (1894); People v. Owens, 8 
Utah 20, 28 P. 871 (1892). The substantive 
and procedural rules were then altered by 
statute. See, e.g., Compiled Laws of Utah 
§§ 1790,1807, 6990, 7058-73, 7525-29, 9465 
(1917). This legislation was not compre-
hensive, and our subsequent decisions seem 
to take the position that to the extent the 
common law was not inconsistent with the 
statutes, it survives and can continue to 
evolve. See, e.g., Powers v. Taylor, 14 
Utah 2d 118, 378 P.2d 519 (1963); Robin-
son v. City Court ex rel. City of Ogden, 
112 Utah 36, 47-49, 185 P.2d 256, 261-62 
(1947) (Wolfe, J., concurring). The relevant 
statutory law is now in sections 78-32-1 
through -16, and sections 78-7-17 and -18 
of the Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-7-
17 to -18, 78-32-1 to -16 (1987). 
Looking to these sources, we must con-
sider three questions in determining the 
propriety of the district court's contempt 
order: (i) whether the order is appealable; 
(ii) whether Thomas was afforded the pro-
cedural protections required; and (iii) 
whether the facts and findings in the 
record satisfy the substantive requirements 
for a finding of contempt. 
2. The distinction between criminal and civil 
contempt was developed in the case law prior to 
enactment of our contempt statutes. See In re 
Whitmore, 9 Utah 441, 35 P. 524 (1894). The 
current statutes do not make that distinction. 
However, a review of later cases shows that 
through the intermingling of statutory and com-
mon law in this area, the distinction continues 
to be important. See, e.g., Limb v. Limb, 113 
Utah 385, 195 P.2d 263 (1948). 
3. While it is the general rule in most jurisdic-
tions that orders of civil contempt are not ap-
pealable, this Court appears to have taken a 
somewhat more pragmatic approach to the 
question. On occasion, we have treated an or-
der of civil contempt as final and appealable. 
See, e.g, Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 
(Utah 1981); Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119 
(Utah 1977); Snow v. Snow, 13 Utah 15, 43 P. 
620 (1896). In Bradshaw, Thomas, and Snow, 
the contempt orders arose out of supplemental 
proceedings after a final judgment; therefore, it 
was unlikely that any subsequent judgment 
would be entered from which an appeal could 
v. rtiUMAS utan 1157 
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Von Hake contends that we should dis-
miss this appeal because the order entered 
against Thomas adjudges him guilty of civil 
contempt and is not appealable. The ap-
pealability of a contempt order has histori-
cally depended on whether the judgment 
could be classified as criminal or civil.2 
Under modern authority, an order finding 
one guilty of criminal contempt is generally 
considered to be a final order separate 
from any ongoing proceedings and appeal-
able as a matter of right. See Utah Power 
& Light Co. v. Richmond Irrigation Co., 
80 Utah 105, 114, 13 P.2d 320, 323 (1932); 
In re Christensen Eng. Co., 194 U.S. 458, 
458-59, 461, 24 S.Ct. 729, 729-30, 731, 48 
L.Ed. 1072 (1904); Carbon Fuel Co. v. 
United Mine Workers of Am., 517 F.2d 
1348, 1349 (4th Cir.1975). On the other 
hand, an order finding one to have commit-
ted a civil contempt is considered interlocu-
tory and not appealable as a matter of 
right. See, e.g., Fox v. Capital Co., 299 
U.S. 105, 107, 57 S.Ct. 57, 59, 81 L.Ed. 67 
(1936); see generally 15 C. Wright, A. Mil-
ler & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3917 (1976 & Supp.1987); 9 J. 
Moore, B. Ward & J. Lucas, Moore's Feder-
al Practice § 110.13[4j (1987 & Supp.1987-
88) (both discussing status of contempt or-
ders as final judgments for purpose of 
appeal).8 
be taken. The instant case is similar in that the 
order here was also entered as a result of sup-
plemental proceedings. This suggests that even 
if the contempt in this case were civil, it could 
well be appealable. The disposition we make of 
this appeal does not require that we decide this 
question. Cf. United States v. McWhirter, 376 
F.2d 102, 105 (5th Cir.1967) (allowing appeal 
from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) pro-
ceedings); 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 3917, at 622-
24 (1976) (suggesting reconsideration of rigid 
federal rule disallowing appeals of civil con-
tempt orders); Knox v. Mun. Court of Des 
Moines, 185 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Iowa 1971) (stat-
ing that because all contempts are considered 
quasi-criminal in Iowa, no distinction is made 
between civil and criminal contempt). 
We also note that the modern rule on appeala-
bility is exactly opposite the former rule which 
allowed appeals from civil contempt orders but 
not from criminal contempt convictions. Com-
pare Robinson v. City Court ex rel City of Ogden, 
112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256 (1947), with In re 
Whitmore, 9 Utah 441, 35 P. 524 (1894). 
[1-6] The primary determinant of 
whether a particular contempt order is to 
be labeled civil or criminal is the trial 
court's purpose m entering the order4 See 
3 C Wright, Federal Practice & Proce-
dure § 704 (1982) A contempt order is 
criminal if its purpose is to vindicate the 
court's authority, as by punishing an indi-
vidual for disobeying an order, even if the 
order arises from civil proceedings See, 
eg, Foreman v Foreman, 111 Utah 113, 
118-19, 176 P2d 165, 168-69 (1947), Utah 
Power & Light Co v Richmond Irriga-
tion Co, 80 Utah at 112-14, 13 P2d at 
323-24 A contempt order is civil if it has 
a remedial purpose, either to coerce an 
individual to comply with a court order 
given for the benefit of another party or to 
compensate an aggrieved party for injuries 
resulting from the failure to comply with 
an order See, e g, Bradshaw v Kershaw, 
627 P 2d 528, 530 (Utah 1981), Shilhtani v 
United States, 384 US 364, 368-70, 86 
S Ct 1531, 1534-36, 16 L Ed 2d 622 (1966), 
cf In re Whitmore, 9 Utah 441, 35 P 524, 
526-29 (1894) (discussing the differences 
between criminal and civil contempt) It is 
important to note that it is the purpose, not 
the method of the punishment, that serves 
to distinguish the two types of proceedings 
Both fines and impnsonment may be used 
4. When a court s purpose for issuing a contempt 
order is not clear, we will consider other 
factors The caption placed on the contempt 
proceeding is one such factor, because the cap-
tion should indicate whether the proceeding is a 
continuation of the underlying civil action or an 
independent criminal action See Nye v United 
States, 313 U.S 33, 42, 61 SCt 810 812 85 
LEd 1172 (1941) 
5. After this opinion had been prepared, the 
United States Supreme Court released its opin 
ion in Hicks ex ret Fetock v Fetock, — U.S 
, 108 SCt 1423, 99 LEdJd 721 (1988) 
Although the Fetock majority ostensibly merely 
followed the Court's prior cases, we agree with 
the dissenting justices that, in fact, Fetock sigmf 
icantly alters the federal rule for determining 
whether a contempt order is civil or criminal in 
nature See id. — U.S at , 108 S Ct 
at 1437-39 (O'Connor, J, dissenting) 
Under the reformulated Fetock rule, the pn 
mary criterion for making such a classification 
is the fixed or contingent character of the pun 
ishment imposed Other indicators of a trial 
court's purpose are germane but must give way 
to that primary criterion 
to coerce a party or remedy a failure to 
perform as well as to vindicate a court's 
authonty See Bradshaw, 627 P 2d at 530, 
Utah Code Ann §§ 78-32-10 to -12 (1987) 
One distinguishing factor is whether the 
fine or sentence is conditional A remedial 
purpose is indicated when the contemner is 
allowed to purge him or herself of the 
contempt by complying with the court's 
orders Maggio v Zeitz, 333 U S 56, 68, 68 
SCt 401, 407, 92 LEd 476 (1948), see 
Utah Code Ann § 78-32-12 (1987) (allow 
ing conditional impnsonment)5 
[7] In the present case, the trial court 
stated two reasons for the contempt order 
(l) Thomas's failure to appear personally at 
the May 4th hearing, and (n) Thomas's 
failure to produce copies of certain tax 
returns To the extent that the order was 
intended to punish Thomas for failing to 
appear, it was cnminal Thomas's failure 
to appear was a direct affront to the digni 
ty and the authonty of the court The 
order of contempt issued in response to his 
failure to appear was meant to vindicate 
that authonty by punishing Thomas, not to 
remedy his absence This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that the sentence is a 
flat thirty days and not conditional, as, for 
example, "thirty days, or until defendant 
purges himself of contempt" If the 
• 
Although we, like the Feiock dissenters differ 
with the majority s reading of pnor cases on 
this point, we are in accord with the majority s 
express objective of clearing up a confusing 
area of the law Fetock establishes a bright line 
rule that must be applied by both federal and 
state courts whenever a federal constitutional 
issue is raised Although Feiock is not binding 
on state courts applying state law it would be 
unnecessarily confusing and impractical for our 
courts to follow one rule for federal constitu 
tional questions and a different rule for ques-
tions of state law 
To avoid such confusion, we now prospec 
tively only, adopt the Feiock approach as a mat 
ter of state law For all future cases we will 
follow the rule that a contempt order is cnmi 
nal if the fine or sentence imposed is fixed and 
unconditional, but is civil if the fine or impns 
onment is conditional such that the contemner 
can obtain relief from the contempt order mere 
ly by doing some act as ordered by the court 
Further, a contempt order is civil if the order is 
to pay a fine to the other party rather than to 
the court See Fetock, — US at 
108 S Ct at 1429-34 
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court's purpose were remedial, l e , to 
coerce Thomas to appear at a later heanng, 
the court could simply have ordered Thom-
as arrested and brought in rather than 
using the contempt order to coerce him to 
appear See Utah Code Ann § 78-32-4 
(1987) Furthermore, the order of impris-
onment afforded no relief to Von Hake 
Thus, the order of contempt is cnminal m 
nature and therefore appealable to the ex-
tent that the contempt was Thomas's fail-
ure to appear m the face of a direct order 
[8] The second basis for the finding of 
contempt was Thomas's failure to produce 
the tax returns as ordered Although the 
matter is not entirely clear, we conclude 
that m this respect, the contempt should be 
labeled civil The tnal judge referred sev-
eral times dunng the heanng to Thomas's 
dilatory and obstructionist tactics aimed at 
frustrating discovery His findings also 
emphasized Thomas's intransigence And 
Thomas had been repeatedly warned be-
forehand that he would be held in contempt 
if he failed to produce the documents as 
ordered All this makes it appear that the 
underlying purpose of this portion of the 
contempt order was to coerce Thomas to 
produce the documents Such a purpose 
makes the order of contempt civil and, un-
der the general rule, not appealable But 
cf United States v Joyce, 498 F 2d 592, 
595 (7th Cir 1974) (failure to produce classi-
fied as cnminal) However, because this 
contempt order appears to have both civil 
and cnminal aspects, and because the order 
is properly before us msofar as it is cnmi-
nal, we will consider all the bases advanced 
in support of it below See 3 C Wnght, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 704, at 
828 (1982) (if order combines civil and enm-
6 Thomas's briefs make it difficult to determine 
whether he relies on the due process provisions 
of the Utah Constitution as well as the federal 
provision Because he has not briefed the state 
constitutional issues separately we analyze his 
claims solely under the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment of the federal consti 
tution See State v Lafferty, 749 P2d 1239, 
1247 n 5 (Utah 1988), compare US Const 
amend XIV with Utah Const art I, §§ 7, 12 
Thomas also argues that he was demed due 
process by the court's failure to allow him a jury 
tnal However, he did not raise the issue in his 
initial brief to this Court, but rather in his reply 
1162 (Utah 1988) 
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mal elements, cnmmal aspect controls for 
purposes of appealability) 
Having concluded that the contempt or-
der is properly before us, the next question 
is whether it was properly entered This 
question has two aspe"cts, one procedural 
and one substantive We first consider 
Thomas's contentions that he was denied 
his procedural nghts 
Thomas argues that he was denied the 
due process protections of the fourteenth 
amendment because Von Hake did not file 
an affidavit spelling out the facts constitut-
ing contempt pnor to the May 4th heanng 
and because the court did not hold a sepa-
rate heanng on the issue of contempt6 
The fourteenth amendment's due process 
clause requires that one facing the possibil-
ity of a contempt order must be afforded 
certain minimal procedural protections 
See Burgers v Maiben, 652 P2d 1320, 
1322 (Utah 1982) The question is What 
are the protections due process requires m 
a case such as this7 We first look to the 
relevant statutes 
The Code sets out two distinct proce-
dures to be followed m contempt adjudica-
tions, one when the contempt is direct, l e, 
committed in the presence of the judge, and 
the other when the contempt is indirect, 
I e, committed outside the presence of the 
judge Section 78-32-3 provides that di-
rect contempt may be punished summanly 
Nothing more is required than that the 
judge enter an order "reciting the facts as 
occurring m such immediate view and pres-
ence [of the court], adjudging that the per-
son proceeded against is thereby guilty of 
a contempt, and that he [or she] be pun-
ished" by fine or impnsonment Utah 
bnef Under Utah Supreme Court Rule 24(c) 
(formerly Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
24(c)), as a general rule we will not consider an 
issue raised for the first time in a reply brief 
See Romrell v Ztons First Natl Bank, 611 P 2d 
392, 395 (Utah 1980) Thomas presents no rea 
son for us to disregard that general policy, and 
we decline to do so We note, however, that the 
United States Supreme Court has held that there 
is no federal constitutional right to a jury tnal 
on cnminal contempt charges that amount only 
to petty offenses See Hicks ex ret Fetock v 
Fetock, — US , 108 SCt 1423, 1430 n 5, 
99 LEd 2d 721 (1988) 
Code Ann. § 78-32-3 (1987). Such summa-
ry proceedings for direct contempt are jus-
tified because they enable the court to 
maintain its authority by immediately pun-
ishing conduct that interferes with judicial 
administration. See Brown v. Cook, 123 
Utah 505, 513, 260 P.2d 544, 548 (1953); 
Ingram v. State, 650 P.2d 888, 891 (Okla. 
Crim.App.1982). It has been held that due 
process requirements are satisfied in a 
summary proceeding for direct contempt 
because the judge has personally witnessed 
the acts constituting contempt and the per-
son committing the contempt has full 
knowledge of the nature of the contempt 
charge and an opportunity to defend 
against the charge. See City of Bernalillo 
v. Aragon, 100 N.M. 547, 549, 673 P.2d 831, 
833 (Ct.App.1983); Commonwealth v. Mar-
cone, 487 Pa. 572, 579, 410 A.2d 759, 763 
(1980); 17 AmJur.2d Contempt § 88 
(1964). Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 42(a) is substantially similar to section 
78-32-3 of the Code; both allow summary 
proceedings for direct contempt. The fed-
eral rule has been upheld against numer-
ous constitutional challenges. See, e.g., 
United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 95 
S.Ct. 1802, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975); see also 
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) (providing federal 
courts with power to punish contempt); Ex 
parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 309, 9 S.Ct. 77, 
81, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888) (upholding common 
law rule allowing summary proceedings for 
direct contempt). 
Indirect contempt, in contrast to direct 
contempt, can properly be adjudged only in 
a proceeding more tightly hedged about 
with procedural protections. The due pro-
cess provision of the federal constitution 
requires that in a prosecution for a con-
tempt not committed in the presence of the 
court, "the person charged be advised of 
the nature of the action against him [or 
her], have assistance of counsel, if request-
ed, have the right to confront witnesses, 
and have the right to offer testimony on 
his [or her] behalf." Burgers v. Maiben, 
652 P.2d at 1322; see U.S. Const amend. 
XIV; cf. Robinson v. City Court ex rel 
City ofOgden, 112 Utah at 42, 185 P.2d at 
259 (applying Utah Const art. I, § 12 to 
criminal contempt proceedings). These 
protections are amplified upon in the Code, 
which requires, inter alia, that in a case of 
indirect contempt, an affidavit must be 
presented to the court reciting the facts 
constituting the contempt in order to en-
sure that the court and the person charged 
are informed of the conduct alleged to be 
contemptuous. Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3 
(1987); Robinson, 112 Utah at 41, 185 P.2d 
at 258. 
In the present case, Thomas contends 
that he was entitled to be proceeded 
against in the fashion prescribed for indi-
rect contempt. Because the trial court pro-
ceeded in a more summary fashion—specif-
ically, without an affidavit specifying the 
contemptuous conduct or a separate hear-
ing on the charge—Thomas claims he was 
denied his statutory and constitutional 
rights. 
As noted, the contempt order was based 
both on Thomas's failure to appear and on 
his failure to produce documents. The pro-
cedures followed with respect to each 
ground for the contempt order must be 
considered separately to determine their 
lawfulness. We deal first with Thomas's 
failure to appear at the May 4th hearing. 
It is undisputed that no affidavit was filed 
with respect to this conduct. Therefore, if 
Thomas's failure to appear constituted an 
indirect contempt only, the judgment is de-
fective under section 78-32-3. On the oth-
er hand, if his failure to appear amounted 
to direct contempt, Thomas was not enti-
tled to the procedures he seeks. 
[9] We have never decided whether a 
party's failure to appear at a hearing when 
directed to do so by court order is a form 
of direct or indirect contempt, and we have 
found no cases directly addressing the is-
sue in other jurisdictions. Courts in other 
states have split on the analogous issue of 
whether an attorney's failure to appear at 
a scheduled hearing is a direct contempt. 
Some hold that an attorney's failure to 
appear cannot logically be said to occur in 
the court's presence as is required for di-
rect contempt See, e.g., State v. Dia-
mond, 94 N.M. 118, 121, 607 P.2d 656, 659 
(CtApp.1980); Johnson v. State, 599 P.2d 
416, 418 (Okla.Crim.App.1979). The Utah 
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Court of Appeals has recently taken that 
position, holding that an attorney's failure 
to appear at his client's criminal trial was 
conduct that "occurred outside of the court's 
view, because the conduct consisted of his ab-
sence from court." State v. Halverson, 754 
P.2d 1228, 1230 (Utah Ct.App.1988). How-
ever, we find more persuasive those deci-
sions which hold that an attorney's failure 
to appear can, in appropriate circumstanc-
es, be regarded as conduct that occurs in 
the court's presence and represents an im-
mediate interference with the administra-
tion of the court so as to justify summary 
proceedings. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 
46 Md.App. 138, 149, 416 A.2d 748, 755 
(1980); Chula v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 
199, 203, 368 P.2d 107, 110, 18 Cal.Rptr. 
507, 510 (1962); cf. Brown v. Cook, 123 
Utah 505, 513, 260 P.2d 544, 548 (1953) 
(upholding a contempt conviction of a party 
for failure to bring a child into court for a 
custody hearing). 
In the same vein, we think that a party's 
failure to appear in court when ordered to 
do so can, in appropriate circumstances, be 
treated as a form of direct contempt. This 
case presents the appropriate circumstanc-
es. 
[10] Thomas's failure to appear directly 
and immediately interfered with the court's 
ability to conduct the hearing. The circum-
stances clearly ensured that Judge Tibbs 
had personal knowledge of the necessary 
facts, that the substantive elements of con-
tempt were present, that Thomas knew his 
conduct would be treated as contemptuous, 
and that Thomas had ample opportunity to 
defend his conduct—both prior to the hear-
ing and through counsel at the hearing.7 
On these facts, we conclude that Thomas's 
failure to appear was committed in the 
"presence of the court" for purposes of 
section 78-32-3. Accordingly, we find that 
7. We recognize that circumstances might arise 
in which a contemner would have a valid de-
fense to a charge of contempt for failure to 
appear, but would have no reasonable opportu-
nity to present that defense, and the court 
would not otherwise be informed of the rele-
vant facts. We are not faced with those circum-
stances here—as Judge Tibbs was aware of the 
relevant facts and Thomas had the opportunity 
to justify his conduct We note, however, that 
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the combination of circumstances in this 
case made it appropriate to use the summa-
ry procedures provided in section 78-32-3 
of the Code, which Judge Tibbs did, and 
that these procedures met the minimum 
requirements of due process. 
[11,12] The second basis for the con-
tempt order was Thomas's failure to pro-
duce the tax returns. The court had or-
dered him to produce the documents at the 
office of Von Hake's counsel prior to the 
May 4th hearing. Thomas's conduct in fail-
ing to produce the returns is properly clas-
sified as an indirect contempt because it 
occurred outside the court's presence. The 
record shows that the more elaborate pro-
cedures required for indirect contempts 
were followed with respect to this conduct. 
The statutory requirement of an affidavit 
was satisfied. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-32-3 (1987). In response to Thomas's 
April 23rd motion for an additional exten-
sion of time, Von Hake's counsel submitted 
an affidavit in opposition which asserted 
that Thomas had willfully refused to com-
ply with the court's order directing the 
production of the tax returns. In his oppo-
sition papers, Von Hake's counsel also re-
quested that the court proceed with the 
previously scheduled show-cause hearing 
on Thomas's failure to produce. Thomas 
had earlier been apprised, by the court's 
order of February 1st and by the state-
ments made at the March 2nd hearing and 
in the March 12th order, that if he did not 
produce the returns as ordered, then at the 
May 4th hearing he would be required to 
show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt Therefore, Thomas had ample 
notice of the charges made against him and 
of the pendency of the show-cause hearing, 
at which he was afforded the right to 
present evidence and confront witnesses, 
when a failure to appear is being considered as 
contemptuous conduct and such circumstantial 
justifications for summary proceedings are lack-
ing, it would be appropriate to subsequently 
allow the contemner a reasonable opportunity 
to seek relief from the contempt order by 
presenting the court with facts previously un-
known to it which would constitute a valid 
defense for the charge of contempt. 
with the assistance of counsel. Thomas 
chose not to attend the May 4th hearing, 
but to send counsel to present his position. 
On these facts, we conclude that the 
procedural requirements both of section 
78-32-3 and of the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause were met with 
respect to both bases of the contempt or-
der. Having concluded that the proper pro-
cedures were followed, we are left with the 
question of whether the substantive ele-
ments of contempt were proven. 
[13,14] As a general rule, in order to 
prove contempt for failure to comply with a 
court order it must be shown that the per-
son cited for contempt knew what was 
required, had the ability to comply, and 
intentionally failed or refused to do so. 
Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1156 
(Utah 1983); Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 
1119, 1121 (Utah 1977). But cf. Gill v. 
Gill, 718 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah 1986) (Zim-
merman, J., dissenting) (no intent required 
for civil contempt for violation of court 
order). These three elements must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a 
criminal contempt proceeding, Gompers v. 
Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 
444, 31 S.Ct 492, 499, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911), 
and by clear and convincing evidence in a 
civil contempt proceeding. Thomas v. 
Thomas, 569 P.2d at 1121. 
[15,16] The trial court must enter writ-
ten findings of fact and conclusions of law 
with respect to each of the three substan-
tive elements. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 
P.2d 543, 544 (Utah 1981); Thomas v. 
Thomas, 569 P.2d at 1122; Race v. Race, 
740 P.2d 253, 258 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., 
dissenting); Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). But cf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7&-32-3 (1987). On re-
view of both criminal and civil proceedings, 
we accept the trial court's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); 
Utah R.Crim.P. 26(7) (codified at Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-26(7) (Supp.1987)); Utah 
R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
[17] We first consider Thomas's crimi-
nal contempt conviction for failing to ap-
pear. The order of commitment contains 
adequate written findings and conclusions, 
and we conclude that the record shows 
each element was proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. Thomas had notice of what 
was required of him via the court's order 
that he must appear at the May 4th hear-
ing unless he had first produced the re-
turns and that if he failed to appear, he 
would be held in contempt. The trial court 
also had ample evidence that Thomas had 
the ability to comply with the order to 
appear. Thomas had several weeks after 
the entry of the order within which to 
inform the court of any reason that he 
would not be able to appear. He filed the 
motion for a postponement of the hearing 
only on the hearing day, May 4th, with no 
earlier notice to the court or Von Hake. 
The sole evidence offered to show that he 
was unable to appear was the conclusory 
statement in the physician's affidavit that 
Thomas was receiving psychiatric treat-
ment and that his condition would be exac-
erbated by appearing at the hearing. The 
trial court was not required to accept the 
affidavit as conclusive proof that Thomas 
could not attend the hearing, especially in 
light of the facts, presented to the court, 
that Thomas had travelled from Salt Lake 
City to Kanab that day with his attorney 
and had participated in a lengthy court 
proceeding only one week earlier. Thomas 
presented no evidence that his purported 
illness had arisen so recently as to justify a 
last-minute motion for postponement. Cf. 
Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 363, 49 S.Ct. 
173, 174, 73 L.Ed. 419 (1929) (contemner's 
alleged inability to comply with underlying 
order is not to be considered absent a 
showing that the inability has arisen since 
the date of the order). Under these cir-
cumstances, we cannot find clearly errone-
ous the trial court's conclusion that Thom-
as was merely engaging in dilatory tactics 
and that he had not raised a reasonable 
doubt about his ability to appear as or-
dered. 
Finally, there is sufficient evidence that 
Thomas's failure to appear was willful. As 
noted, he did travel to Kanab with his 
attorney, so he was in the immediate vicini-
ty of the courthouse; yet he did not ap-
pear. By submitting his motion to post-
pone at the last minute, in lieu of actually 
appearing, without warning to Von Hake 
or the court, and in the face of his failure 
to comply with the order to produce, Thom-
as gave the court ample basis to find that 
he was simply attempting to postpone fac-
ing the court and the almost certain pros-
pect of a contempt finding. Thomas took a 
calculated risk that his untimely claim of 
legal disability would be rejected and his 
motion to postpone would be denied. The 
taking of that risk made his failure to 
appear as ordered willful. 
[18] We next consider the second 
ground for the contempt order, Thomas's 
failure to produce the tax returns. Re-
garding the requirement of written find-
ings and conclusions, the order of commit-
ment states only that Thomas had been 
ordered to produce the documents, that 
Von Hake's counsel had notified the court 
that Thomas had made no effort to produce 
the tax returns, and that the court had 
determined that Thomas had failed to pro-
duce the returns as ordered. These deter-
minations adequately relate that Thomas 
knew what was required of him and failed 
to comply. And the record reveals clear 
and convincing evidence to support such 
findings. 
However, the order does not provide 
written findings and conclusions regarding 
Thomas's ability to comply with the order 
to produce the tax returns. Thomas has 
strenuously argued that he is unable to 
produce the returns. Von Hake has con-
sistently disputed the issue. Ordinarily, we 
would defer to the trial court's assessment 
of such conflicting evidence. However, the 
lack of written findings and conclusions on 
that issue prevents our effective review of 
the question. Given our disposition of the 
direct criminal contempt order, we conclude 
that the indirect civil contempt order 
should be reversed for lack of the requisite 
written findings and conclusions.8 
Thomas also seeks reversal of the under-
lying orders requiring him to produce the 
8. We do not imply that Thomas does not in fact 
have the ability to obtain the documents or that 
he may not be ordered to produce them under 
penalty of contempt, so long as the court fol-
lows the procedural and substantive rules we 
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tax returns, requiring him to appear at the 
May 4th hearing, denying extensions of 
time, and denying his motion to strike the 
affidavit of Von Hake's counsel regarding 
Thomas's ability to produce the tax re-
turns. Given our disposition of the civil 
contempt judgment, we need not address 
the validity of the order to produce the 
returns or the order denying an extension 
of time. We have examined the remaining 
arguments and find them to be without 
merit. 
The judgment of civil contempt is re-
versed. The conviction of criminal con-
tempt is affirmed, the stay of execution is 
released, and the matter is remanded to the 
trial court for execution of the thirty-day 
sentence. 
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., 
concur. 
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jured motorist, insured motorist brought 
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have outlined for indirect civil contempt pro-
ceedings. We do not reach the issue of whether 
there is clear and convincing proof that Thomas 
was able to comply with the order to produce 
the corporate and partnership returns. 
